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INTRODUCTION 
Land reform has become a commonplace development 
strategy in nations around the world.  Agrarian reform is an 
attractive method of doing development work because it focuses 
on land as one of the primary social goods available within every 
state.  Some land reform programs set forth to provide clear legal 
title to landowners who occupy land under customary land 
tenure agreements.  Other models of agrarian reform attempt to 
resolve land-related disputes in an effort to clarify land rights.  
Yet another array of programs broadens access to arable land; 
this redistributive variety of land reform is the focus of this 
Article. 
While it is tempting to think of these programs as a panacea, 
they can fail for an array of reasons.  Failed land reform 
undermines all land reform efforts because it creates a 
fundamental skepticism about why nations should even bother to 
attempt to broaden access to land.  Land reform’s typically 
inchoate goals likewise compound this effect of leaving initiatives 
rootless, resulting in an open question as to whether land reform 
is a worthwhile endeavor.  But the reality is that land reform is a 
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noble, valuable cause.  Properly executed land reform reduces 
poverty, permits families to accrue wealth, and helps nations 
fulfill their human rights obligations.1  It also builds human 
capacity, which endows developing2 nations with the most 
valuable resource: citizens capable of solving the toughest 
problems their countries face.3  In addition, land reform can 
achieve expressive goals, giving citizens a sense of identity and a 
nation a sense of pride in its own potential as a competent, 
autonomous, modern state.4  These practical and expressive goals 
are many and real, and they can have a significant impact on the 
shape of land reform programs.  But they too often go unstated, 
and the result is a land reform program that is detached from its 
own aspirations. 
This Article begins the project of constructing a unified 
account of land reform.  This model consists of two central 
aspects.  First, it articulates a set of goals, both practical and 
expressive, that redistributive land reform efforts can forward.  
Second, it offers a pragmatic theory of land reform, one that  
simultaneously achieves the progressive, poverty-eradication 
goals of land reform proponents and satisfies neoliberal demand 
for stable land markets.  In this regard, the project offers a fresh 
way of thinking of the intractable conflict in land reform policy: 
how to redistribute land without destabilizing the nation.  In 
addressing this problem, the Article brings a conversation about 
land reform that primarily exists in development studies into the 
legal literature and informs that discussion with legal insights. 
 
1 See infra Parts I.A.1, 2, and 4. 
2 The language of developed and developing is a contested shorthand to describe 
distinctions among nations with regard to gross domestic product. Many alternatives 
exist, such as first-, second-, and third-world, industrialized and unindustrialized, or 
global north and global south, but all of these are plagued with problems. This 
Article mostly refers to developing countries, or occasionally countries of the global 
south, but acknowledges the awkwardness of choosing a shorthand for these 
descriptions. Dayo Olopade, Op-Ed., The End of the ‘Developing World’, N.Y. TIMES 
Mar. 2, 2014, at SR4 (advocating for the use of the terms “fat” and “lean”). Martha 
Nussbaum has observed that “[a]ll countries are ‘developing countries,’ although 
that phrase is sometimes used to refer to poorer countries: every nation has a lot of 
room for improvement in delivering an adequate quality of life to all its people.” 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH, at x (2011). 
3 See infra Part I.A.3. 
4 See infra Part I.B. 
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I briefly defines 
what redistributive land reform is before moving on to identify 
and discuss land reform’s pragmatic and expressive goals.  Part 
II takes on the controversial problem of redistribution.  It 
differentiates between expropriation-based models of land reform 
and market-compatible models, explains how expropriation can 
undermine development goals, and reveals how  
market-compatible approaches maintain the economic stability 
needed for meaningful development.  Part III fleshes out how 
land reform programs operate, distinguishing among different 
land reform strategies.  The Article concludes by observing that 
while market-compatible land reform makes good sense, both 
logically and theoretically, it will rise or fall based on whether 
enough land is made available to address the problem of rural 
poverty; it calls upon legal scholars of many doctrines to help 
shape policies and laws that support robust land reform 
initiatives. 
I. GOALS OF LAND REFORM 
Land reform programs operate with a multifaceted approach 
to resolving public policy problems regarding agricultural lands, 
including, first, efforts to formalize title5 and, second, dispute 
resolution processes to quiet title conflicts.6  A third kind of 
agrarian reform is based on redistributive efforts designed to 
democratize land access.7  All of these programs are typically 
pursued as one component of a larger movement to reform land 
tenure, access, and security.  While titling and land conflict 
resolutions are important agrarian reform topics, they are 
 
5 Formalization of title is the topic of a broad literature, both from legal and 
development scholars. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: 
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 46–62 
(2003) (discussing the benefits of titling and other aspects of a formal property 
system). While this topic is discussed further in the analysis of the value of title for 
land reform beneficiaries, see infra Part I.B.2, this Article focuses on land reform 
initiatives dedicated to redistribution of lands, not formalization of title. 
6 For example, Indonesia’s agrarian reform program includes dispute resolution, 
in light of more than 7,000 significant land disputes and conflicts in 2007. Joyo 
Winoto, Taking Land Policy and Administration in Indonesia to the Next Stage, in 
INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS RECOGNITION, ADMINISTRATION, AND GOVERNANCE 1, 
2–3, 7 (Klaus Deininger et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INNOVATIONS IN LAND 
RIGHTS]. 
7 SATURNINO M. BORRAS, JR., PRO-POOR LAND REFORM: A CRITIQUE 1 (2007) 
(stating that redistribution of land is a current issue in international development). 
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peripheral to this Article, which focuses on redistributive efforts.  
For the remainder of this Article, the term “land reform” denotes 
this kind of program designed to broaden access to land. 
In order to critically analyze this kind of redistributive land 
reform and the mechanisms used to accomplish it, it is crucial to 
grasp the logic that underlies efforts to redistribute lands and 
understand why a government might want to pursue land 
reform.  Land reform is one of the most practical forms of modern 
international development work in the global south.  The 
possession of land is a bulwark against food insecurity,8 poverty,9 
and social upheaval.10  The ability to borrow against land may 
provide poor persons in many countries with access to a 
previously unknown level of financial security through the ability 
to purchase additional real property, develop small businesses, or 
support children in their pursuit of higher education.11  In these 
regards, land reform serves the deeply practical goal of 
improving the concrete well-being of a country’s population.  
Coupled with these pragmatic functions, democratizing real 
property ownership in developing countries demonstrates the 
rise of democratic regimes and the retreat of colonialist 
governance models.12  Within countries accustomed to wealth 
concentration in the hands of few, land reform signifies a shift 
from colonialist values to the reality of a more egalitarian state, 
one in which the nation’s wealth accrues to a wide array of 
citizens instead of only the privileged, foreigners, and outside 
investors.  Land reform thus represents popular hopes in poor 
countries: that average people, too, may have access to their 
homeland’s patrimony.  This Part of the Article serves to identify 
and explain the many goals that nations may attempt to 
accomplish by investing public money and effort into land reform 
programs.  These goals are what make land reform a cause 
worthy of public support and additional scholarly consideration. 
 
8 Thembela Kepe & Danielle Tessaro, Integrating Food Security with Land 
Reform: A More Effective Policy for South Africa, CIGI-AFRICA INITIATIVE POLICY 
BRIEF SERIES, Aug. 2012, at 1, 1–2. 
9 Krishna B. Ghimire, Land Reform at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 
LAND REFORM & PEASANT LIVELIHOODS 1, 1 (Krishna B. Ghimire ed., 2001). 
10 Id. at 2. 
11 DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 48, 216. 
12 Cherryl Walker et al., Introduction to LAND, MEMORY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND 
JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LAND CLAIMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (Cherryl Walker et al., 
eds., 2010). 
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A. Pragmatic Goals of Land Reform 
Land reform is most valuable because it can improve the 
lives of actual poor people who live in rural parts of developing 
countries.  This simple statement belies the multifaceted 
complexity of what land reform might accomplish in poor rural 
communities.  Articulating these pragmatic goals serves multiple 
purposes.  First, it offers a practical justification for efforts to 
democratize land access.  A social welfare program that serves no 
meaningful purpose in society is arguably pointless and probably 
even poses problems of moral hazard.13  Second, providing a 
public rationale for investing public resources in programs to 
democratize land access legitimizes social safety net programs.  
Understanding what a nation is trying to accomplish with land 
reform and why that is socially relevant and valuable is a crucial 
first step in being able to evaluate the relative successes and 
failures of various approaches to these programs. 
1. Land Reform Reduces Poverty and Its Worst Consequences 
Land ownership can play a significant role in solving the 
problem of rural poverty.  For the landless rural poor, lacking 
meaningful access to their own land to cultivate means they are 
constantly dependent on wage labor to support their families.  In 
rural places where the economy is based on small family 
businesses that provide few employment opportunities to 
strangers, scarce wage labor can be a recipe for constant 
economic insecurity.14  Gaining access to land allows a steadier 
 
13 Land reform initiatives that do not tangibly improve the lot of the intended 
beneficiaries often saddle poor people with debt and unproductive land while 
potentially providing benefits of electoral popularity and support to the elected 
officials who initiated the programs. States are unlikely to avoid these kinds of 
flawed land reform initiatives, unless the state is actively paying to support them, 
and the state is protected against risks associated with these programs by shifting 
them onto indebted participants in land reform programs. Thus, this scenario poses 
a moral hazard which effectively leads to the subsidization of a larger amount of 
ineffective land reform than would typically be justified. Martha T. McCluskey, 
Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
115, 138–39 (2000) (discussing with skepticism moral hazard and its use to reject 
social assistance programs). However, because the worst consequences of failed land 
reform programs land squarely on poor people, advocates for the rural poor should 
be skeptical of ill-conceived redistributive land reform programs that worsen the lot 
of the rural poor. 
14 Sam Moyo, Land and Natural Resource Redistribution in Zimbabwe: Access, 
Equity and Conflict, 4 AFR. & ASIAN STUD. 187, 190 (2005) (“Formal employment is 
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form of economic support that offers food, money, and security, 
because land is the primary source of livelihood for rural 
citizens.15  Land has historically signified security to families 
that own it;16 modern land reform efforts are predicated in no 
small part on an attempt to provide economic security to the 
rural poor who rely on access to land as a form of wealth and 
stability.  Gaining land through land reform can help poor rural 
families achieve economic and food security that was unavailable 
to them as landless rural farmworkers. 
Development economists and social scientists have 
documented these important development consequences of land 
reform.17  Well-respected development organizations, including 
the United Nations Development Program, have acted on these 
findings by dedicating substantial effort to encouraging land 
reform initiatives.18  Countries instigating land reform efforts 
therefore are often choosing to do so for purposes of poverty 
eradication.19  However, unlike other important public assistance 
models, such as  cash transfers, land reform is envisioned as a 
form of social welfare policy that relies on individual engagement 
to be successful; it equips families and individuals in poverty  
 
 
unable to absorb the numerous unemployed, land-short, landless and homeless.” 
(citation omitted)). 
15 Id. at 188 (“[Land and national] resources are the key direct source of 
livelihood and wealth for the majority [in Africa]. They are also the means through 
which the poor pay for their education, health services, and hence a critical means to 
attain non-agricultural employment.”). Legal scholar Lisa Pruitt has observed that, 
in 2012, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women featured as its 
theme “the empowerment of rural women and their role in poverty and hunger 
eradication, development and current challenges,” but that even though women and 
girls reinvest ninety percent of their income in their families, they own less than two 
percent of land. See Lisa Pruitt, Rural Women and the Limits of Law: Reflections on 
CSW 56, JURIST (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/03/lisa-pruitt-
un-women.php#.U1Vk_cYnL1o (internal quotation marks omitted). Providing 
women with access to land is therefore a promising strategy for increasing food 
security and eradicating hunger and poverty. 
16 See Shelley Cavalieri, Theorizing Land Reform (July 9, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing at length the role of land in signifying 
social status). 
17 See generally Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Land Reform, Poverty 
Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India, 115 Q.J. ECON. 389 (2000). 
18 Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Terry McKinley, The Unresolved Land Reform 
Debate: Beyond State-Led or Market-Led Models, UNITED NATIONS DEV. 
PROGRAMME, Nov. 2006, at 1, 3, available at http://www.ipc-
undp.org/pub/IPCPolicyResearchBrief2.pdf. 
19 See Besley & Burgess, supra note 17, at 392–94. 
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with the means to overcome their own economic deprivation 
without requiring continuous infusions of government funds to do 
so.20 
2. Land Reform Can Provide Title, Which Allows Families To 
Accrue Wealth 
Land reform may also lead to the kind of land titling that 
economists have demonstrated helps poor families accumulate 
adequate economic resources to engage more meaningfully in the 
modern economy of developing nations.  Hernando de Soto’s work 
on the topic of titles to land has argued that lack of access to a 
stable, marketable land title denies poor families entrée to the 
economic opportunities that capital provides.21  Land with secure 
title, against which families are able to borrow, can help 
smallholders obtain capital that can be used to achieve other 
goals.22  Such capital can be a source of financial security to 
purchase real estate, develop small businesses, or support 
children’s education.23  De Soto’s work has documented the 
capital-generating aspects of titling and how titles can provide 
families with greater economic security than they possessed prior 
to obtaining land and stable title; he has argued that this creates 
long-term change within a society.24  As a result of this body of 
scholarship, many nations have undertaken efforts to clarify title 
to property.25 
 
20 Of course, in the instance of land reform accomplished by means of state-led 
distribution of land, this claim is somewhat misleading. If the state transfers land to 
the poor instead of transferring money to the poor, it has in essence made a wealth 
transfer in either instance. The only distinction, of course, is that conveying land 
may equip those who are poor to be able to address their own poverty without 
continued government involvement through repeated cash transfers. Cash transfers 
are an important poverty-eradication strategy, but they require a steadily funded 
government to continue to provide them. Despite this potential problem, 
development economists remain focused on the possibility of conditional cash 
transfers as a means of incentivizing the creation of human capital. See generally 
Julia Johannsen et al., Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: Problems and 
Opportunities (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper, 2009), available at   
http://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/2530. 
21 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE 
THIRD WORLD 159–61 (June Abbott trans., 1989). 
22 DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 48, 216. 
23 Id. at 39–40. 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Rita Sinha, Moving Towards Clear Land Titles in India: Potential 
Benefits, a Road Map, and Remaining Challenges, in INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS, 
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This discussion of the benefits of land titling is not without 
its critics.  Development and legal scholars alike have critiqued 
this individualized approach to land ownership by noting that it 
destroys communal and historic models of land tenure26 and 
observing that it may not generate the “security of tenure, 
investment and increased productivity” that are the hallmarks of 
de Soto’s approach.27  Yet even though communal ownership of 
property may preclude community members from accessing this 
range of possible benefits, indigenous communities that are well-
versed in the consequences of losing indigenous lands due to sale 
by individual owners may instead prefer to hold land 
communally, with restraints on alienation.28  Though such 
restraints clearly limit individuals’ abilities to alienate the 
property or borrow against it, the American Indian experience of 
allotment has underscored the fact that distributing communal 
lands to individuals too often leads to the sale of the property,29 
and with it, the loss of the site of communal identity.30  The 
identifiable benefits of land titling, therefore, should be 
considered as one of the range of possible goals that land reform 
could achieve; however, alternative models of reform might 
instead prioritize goals of poverty eradication that can be 
accomplished while title is held in a communal fashion in order 
to prevent the destruction of traditional land tenure practices.31 
 
supra note 6, at 14–20 (describing the system India initiated in 2008 to create clear 
property titles). 
26 Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the 
Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 527–28 (2011). 
27 See Philippe Lavigne Delville, Registering and Administering Customary 
Land Rights: Can We Deal with Complexity?, in INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS, 
supra note 6, at 26. See generally D. BENJAMIN BARROS, HERNANDO DE SOTO AND 
PROPERTY IN A MARKET ECONOMY (D. Benjamin Barros ed., 2010). 
28 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 763 (3d ed. 2010) (observing how 
American Indian tribal governments often attempt to put newly acquired tribal 
lands under the trust status in which tribal title is held). 
29 See Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying To Rest the Ghosts of 
Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 134–35 & n.29 (2012) (discussing 
how the reduction of government support of Indians and changes in agriculture left 
individual Indian allotment owners in desperate economic straits and thus willing to 
sell their allotments). 
30 See Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes 
the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 381, 394–95 (1997). 
31 See infra Part III.C. 
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3. Land Reform Builds Human Capability 
The shift from life as a landless rural peasant to living as a 
smallholding farmer is not merely a quantitative increase in 
income but a dramatic qualitative change in kind for the lifestyle 
of land reform beneficiaries.  Landless rural peasants earn wages 
while performing the tasks assigned to them by the owner or 
crew chief in the fields that belong to others.  In some instances, 
this role can be a steady, year-round form of employment.  Far 
more commonly, the historically stable relationship between a 
landowner and farmhands, through which an owner would 
employ and house an entire family, has eroded into a seasonal 
role, day labor, or even piecework.32  For landless peasants, this 
kind of temporary labor relationship means that workers 
maintain relatively little day-to-day control over the tasks that 
comprise their work or decision-making authority to determine 
how and when work is performed.  Instead, owners or their hired 
crew chiefs decide what agricultural tasks need to be performed 
on a daily or weekly basis and assign those tasks to the 
workers.33  Worse yet, the contingent nature of the work 
situations reduces landless peasants’ abilities to plan for steady 
income or to structure their time while waiting for work to 
materialize. 
In contrast, land reform can transform the lives of its 
beneficiaries.  When land reform puts agricultural property in 
the possession of former farm workers, management decisions 
become the responsibility of the individual smallholder or the 





32 This is certainly the case in Guatemala, where the traditional ongoing 
relationships that farmworkers formed with the owners of the land on which they 
worked and lived have disappeared. While there is far less paternalism endemic to 
the new relationships, landowners no longer have obligations for social insurance, 
holiday pay, medical expenses, and other costs that historically would have been 
shifted onto the property owner. David McCreery, Coffee and Indigenous Labor in 
Guatemala, 1871-1980, in THE GLOBAL COFFEE ECONOMY IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND 
LATIN AMERICA, 1500–1989, at 191, 199 (William Gervase Clarence-Smith & Steven 
Topik eds., 2003). 
33 Id. at 196–97. 
34 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of individual and collective models of land 
ownership. 
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increase in autonomy can be both terrifying and empowering for 
individuals who have previously spent their lives working the 
fields of other landowners.35 
This facet of land reform demonstrates how it likewise serves 
the pragmatic goal of building human capacity.  As articulated by 
the human capabilities approach to development, a theory of 
international development most closely associated with 
economist Amartya Sen and legal philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum,36 state actions should focus on increasing individuals’ 
ability to achieve the ends they wish to pursue.37  Although this 
theory has its roots as an economic model in Sen’s version,38 and 
an Aristotelian approach to philosophy in the work of 
Nussbaum,39 the capabilities approach to human development 
has subsequently attracted a substantial following in the field of 
development economics and has taken meaningful root in the 
international arena.40 
Land reform responds to the fundamental concern of the 
capabilities approach to development, which is how to provide 
individuals with capability, defined as “the substantive freedom 
to achieve alternative functioning combinations.”41  Functionings 
 
35 Land reform can serve to reduce the constraints on autonomy experienced by 
poor rural citizens of developing nations. Although constrained autonomy is not 
unique to those at the bottom of social hierarchies, since all people operate with 
some limitations on their array of choices, those with fewer privileges commonly 
have the most circumscribed set of options before them, though this should not be 
viewed as preventing them from exercising their own agency. See Aya Gruber, The 
Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 813–16 (discussing limited sets of 
options and embracing the self-determination rights of persons with fewer choices in 
the context of domestic violence). To the extent that technical assistance can 
improve land reform beneficiaries’ odds of success by increasing their skills set, 
many governments undertaking land reform initiatives offer these kinds of 
programs. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the range of possible government 
involvement in land reform efforts. 
36 Shelley Cavalieri, Capabilities Approach, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY STUDIES (Nancy A. Naples et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2016). 
37 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18 (1999). 
38 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 11 (2000). 
39 SEN, supra note 37, at 24. 
40 See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, 
at 64 (2013), available at hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/ 
hdr2013_en_complete.pdf (“[G]iving primacy to state investment in people’s 
capabilities—especially their health, education and nutrition,” combined with 
increasing their resiliency, “has paid human development dividends.”). 
41 SEN, supra note 37, at 75. 
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are “the various things a person may value doing or being,” and 
they can range from health and well-being to the pursuit of life 
goals and purpose.42  But functionings themselves are not the 
purpose of the capabilities approach; instead, it is the capacity 
that the functionings provide to individuals so they can pursue 
their own life ends and their own vision of the good.43  Land may 
well be the kind of good that capacitates individuals to access an 
array of other functionings, including the income to pay for food, 
health care, and education, as well as the intangibles of dignity, 
self-respect, and a sense of autonomy.  Land reform may thus be 
responsive to this kind of concern by providing a means to access 
other life purposes, as opposed to simply allowing the state to 
directly provide the raw materials.44 
One aspect of the capabilities approach that is particularly 
applicable in the land reform context is that this model does not 
mandate a particular set of life choices.45  The capabilities 
approach offers a helpful framework for contemplating land 
reform because it demands that individuals have meaningful 
options available to them in life.46  Land reform satisfies the 
basic requirements of the capabilities approach because it 
addresses the root source of rural poverty in the developing 
world: the lack of meaningful options for sources of income for 
landless peasants.  But it also honors the other key aspect of the 
capabilities approach by allowing individuals a great degree of 
freedom in living with this solution and thereby augmenting the 
variety of options available to individuals.  Under the capabilities 
approach, access to land can be part of the range of goods that an 
individual can use to pursue his or her own life goals.  
Participation in market-compatible land reform is voluntary 
insofar as states do not mandate that individuals partake.  But 
the capabilities approach does not only give individuals a set of 
goods with which to pursue their own ends.  It also enables 
people to develop increasingly sophisticated capacity to attempt 
further goals and outcomes.  The capacities that land reform 
 
42 Id. 
43 See id. 
44 This is also true in the context of interventions in trafficking for sex work. See 
Shelley Cavalieri, Between Victim and Agent: A Third-Way Feminist Account of 
Trafficking for Sex Work, 86 IND. L.J. 1409, 1457 (2011). 
45 See SEN, supra note 37, at 75–81. 
46 See id. 
FINAL_CAVALIERI 10/21/2015  4:59 PM 
2015] GROUNDING LAND REFORM 13 
builds are not purely provided by the set of primary social goods 
that land reform can offer through economic security; they also 
are a set of skills that result from building the autonomy of land 
reform beneficiaries.  Learning to run a small business and to 
operate with authority over their own labor represents a 
substantial increase in the human capital of those who receive 
land. 
4. Land Reform Helps Nations Fulfill Their Human Rights 
Obligations 
Land reform can also serve the important function of 
furthering the stated goals of human rights treaties, including 
ensuring the rights of all people to participate in cultural life47 
and to earn a living through work,48 thereby bringing states that 
are implementing these kinds of programs into closer compliance 
with their treaty obligations.  While the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides only for the 
progressive realization of its mandates,49 land reform can 
accomplish some aspects of this ongoing, progressive approach to 
development.50  Rights to work51 and to remuneration, which 
provides a decent living,52 are supported by government efforts to 
broaden the base of land ownership in a nation.  When the 
landless rural poor spend their lives as temporary employees on 
the farms owned by others, they rarely have the ability to earn 
adequately to support their families.  But land ownership 
provides what functions as a small business opportunity, 
allowing individuals to work for themselves.  Likewise, rights to 
food53 and housing54 are furthered by land, which gives 




47 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15, 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. 
48 See id. art. 6. 
49 See id. art. 2. 
50 Id. (requiring state parties to take steps toward, not achieve, the rights 
established in the covenant). 
51 Id. art. 6. 
52 Id. art. 7. 
53 Id. art. 11. 
54 Id. 
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build housing for their families.  States that offer land reform as 
a means of reducing rural poverty are simultaneously fulfilling 
their treaty obligations. 
More recent human rights conventions have treated land 
reform as its own topic worthy of consideration.  Article 14(2)(g) 
of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (“CEDAW”) specifically mentions agrarian reform in the 
context of women’s human rights: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, 
on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate 
in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall 
ensure to such women the right . . . [t]o have access to 
agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate 
technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as 
well as in land resettlement schemes . . . .55 
While this article of CEDAW is focused on creating equality 
in access to land reform initiatives among men and women, 
inclusion of land reform in this relatively recent human rights 
convention suggests that land reform is increasingly a 
substantial topic of discussion in human rights and international 
development circles.  Furthermore, that Article 14 specifically 
enumerates the needs of rural women as a distinct category of 
women suggests that rural populations warrant human rights 
and international development interventions that are targeted to 
their circumstances and unique needs.56 
5. Land Reform Responds to the Hierarchy of Human Needs 
The pragmatic goals described thus far build progressively 
one upon the other.  At the first order, without basic food and 
economic security, no other development goals are possible.  
Second-order outcomes of access to the kinds of goods only 
available to those with capital become possible through formal 
titling, including improved housing, small business ownership, 
 
55 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women art. 14, § 2(g), opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered 
into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
56 Lisa R. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW’s Article 14: Naming and Explaining 
Rural Difference, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 347, 352 (2011) (arguing that 
Article 14 of CEDAW is “an example of rural exceptionalism” because it “moves 
beyond the implicit focus on urban populations that characterizes a great deal of 
contemporary law making”). 
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and access to education.  Third-order development of individual 
capacity equips individuals with the skills and abilities they need 
to pursue their own vision of the good, whatever that might be.  
This kind of capacity-building changes communities for the 
better, as they develop a critical mass of individuals dedicated to 
and capable of improving the situation of the whole community.  
And, finally, groups of individuals who have achieved a basic 
modicum of economic well-being and are working to improve 
their own communities in directed and focused ways have the 
ability to help their nation achieve the kinds of development 
goals that are the basis of the economic, social, and cultural 
rights treaties. 
This ordering of the pragmatic goals of land reform resonates 
strongly with Maslow’s well-known hierarchy of needs, which 
conceptualizes human development as occurring in a hierarchical 
fashion.57  Starting with physiological needs, such as food and 
water, Maslow theorized that once these baseline needs were 
met, people could instead focus on physical safety and security, 
then community, belonging, and affection, followed by esteem, 
and ultimately self-actualization.58  These steps correlate closely 
to the interconnected pragmatic goals just discussed.  Food 
security and income allow individuals to achieve this first level of 
physiological needs.  Titling of land provides intergenerational 
security.  Capacity-building serves ends of community, individual 
esteem, and self-actualization for beneficiaries of land reform.  





57 A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 370 
(1943). 
58 Id. at 375–76, 380–82; see also Charles K. Ten Brink, Gayborhoods: 
Intersections of Land Use Regulation, Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 799–800 (2012) (discussing Maslow’s theory in the context of 
the provision of public goods and noting that “[m]unicipalities have not typically 
been thought to be in the business of providing esteem and self-actualization, but in 
fact they often do so without openly recognizing that goal”). Some legal scholars, 
working in concert with labor organizers, have posited that cooperative work 
models—similar to those found on collectively owned farms—can achieve at least the 
first stages of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, though the transformative aspects are 
not experienced by all involved. See Gowri J. Krishna, Worker Cooperative Creation 
as Progressive Lawyering? Moving Beyond the One-Person, One-Vote Floor, 34 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 96 (2013). 
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esteem and self-actualization for the nation as a whole in a 
postcolonialist quest for identity and place in the world 
community.59 
Despite the potential for these many valuable outcomes, 
while land reform can have a transformative effect on the lives of 
its beneficiaries and the states in which they reside, it is not a 
singular solution.  Land reform, like other strategies to address 
poverty, is expensive to implement.  Although the international 
community now has significant knowledge about what 
approaches can reduce extreme poverty in the developing world, 
the reality is that the lack of funds precludes nations from 
actually eradicating poverty.  Even if there were the political 
will, the scarcity of land60 means that land reform cannot be the 
route out of poverty for all poor persons.  But these limitations on 
what land reform can achieve does not discredit all land reform.  
Rather, these limitations highlight the fact that land reform is 
one of many development strategies that can be used in concert 
to address global poverty. 
B. Expressive Goals of Land Reform 
Beyond these practical purposes that land reform can 
accomplish, nations can also initiate these programs to achieve 
expressive goals.  Expression may appear at first examination to 
be an insufficient justification for initiatives that democratize 
land access, easily dismissed as a vacuous, feel-good waste of 
resources or mere propaganda designed to bolster support for an 
embattled government.  However, expression has a powerful role 
in shaping the evolution of nations.  Coupled with pragmatic 
goals, expressive goals can demonstrate the advent of meaningful 
changes in the culture of a nation.  In its most aspirational form, 
land reform can signal a shift towards a government that is more 
responsive to and engaged with its own people; it can 
demonstrate how the state’s resource allocation model is at least 




59 See infra Part I.B. 
60 See Cavalieri, supra note 16 (discussing the role of the scarcity of land in 
shaping land reform programs). 
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Yet land reform that serves purely symbolic ends can 
highlight the presence of a government that views corruption, 
cronyism, and favoritism as legitimate government purposes and 
that is willing to use redistributive efforts such as land reform to 
prop up an otherwise struggling or illegitimate system.61  Where 
land reform founded only on expressive goals bolsters an 
otherwise threatened regime, it stands for an unjustified system 
that undermines the democratic ends of land reform programs.  
While this section articulates the array of expressive purposes 
that land reform programs might serve, these goals only make 
sense when coupled with pragmatic ones as well.  Although 
expressive goals of land reform can capture an important aspect 
of the culture of land access, a program based on symbolism but 
devoid of substance dedicated to improving the status of a 
nation’s poorest citizens is fundamentally illegitimate.  This 
limitation on the role of expression does not, however, diminish 
the importance of knowing what kinds of purposes land reform 
can represent in the national imagination.  Shared meaning has 
long been an important aspect of legal and social change,62 and it 
likewise can be in the context of land reform. 
Many nations implement land reform as part of a 
postcolonialist effort to broaden poor citizens’ access to arable 
land.63  Whether independence has been achieved from rule of a 
 
61 Although this set of traits is not unique to expropriation-based land 
redistributions, transfers of expropriated land in gratitude for political patronage is 
a well-documented phenomenon. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAST TRACK 
LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE 2 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302.pdf (describing “party-political control of 
access to the forms for applying for land and partisan discrimination in the 
allocation of plots” and “the key role of the [ruling political party] militias in 
distributing and allocating land, [which are] the same militias that are responsible 
for violence and intimidation against many who might otherwise apply for a plot”); 
Andre Degeorges & Brian Reilly, Politicization of Land Reform in Zimbabwe: 
Impacts on Wildlife, Food Production and the Economy, 64 INT’L J. ENVTL. STUD. 
571, 574, 576 (2007) (noting that when Zimbabwe undertook its radical land reform 
programs, it already possessed a great deal of land but failed in redistribution and 
resettlement due to “cronyism, nepotism and corruption” and observing that “[m]uch 
of the best land ha[d] ended in the hands of [ruling party] leaders and Government 
officials, military officers and many leading judges”). 
62 One example of this would be the role of the National Health Service in 
solidifying British national identity after World War II. See Donald W. Light, 
Universal Health Care: Lessons from the British Experience, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
25, 26 (2003). 
63 WALKER ET AL., supra note 12. 
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colonial government64 or a puppet government,65 in the 
postcolonial context land reform signals a shift away from 
colonialist values of resource extraction and depletion for the 
enrichment of the colonizing nation.  It demonstrates investment 
in the provision of economic and material support to the citizens 
of a nation.  Prioritizing the use of national resources to eradicate 
poverty and improve the lives of a nation’s own people is both a 
practical and an emblematic change.  Implementation of land 
reform marks a moment where property as personhood ceases to 
be a theory and becomes lived reality.66  Land reform after 
independence signifies the aspiration of the nation to achieve a 
more egalitarian state where wealth accrues to citizens instead of 
foreigners.67 
For land reform beneficiaries in this kind of a system, 
ownership of land represents the deepest hopes of the poor to 
have access to the stability that land signifies and a share of the 
wealth they believe to be the promise of independence from 
colonial powers.68  But it also captures the belief that farming the 
 
64 In nations where colonial powers formally governed, independence involved 
the formation of an autonomous government, though in the Zimbabwean case,  
race-based rule did not fall until a later date. JOSEPH HANLON ET AL., ZIMBABWE 
TAKES BACK ITS LAND 36 (2013). 
65 In other instances, puppet governments were ostensibly comprised of citizens 
who were controlled and shaped through colonial action. JIM HANDY, GIFT OF THE 
DEVIL: A HISTORY OF GUATEMALA 85–88 (1984) (describing the relationship of 
Guatemalan government to the United Fruit Company and the United States 
government). 
66 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,  
957–58 (1982); see also Cavalieri, supra note 16 (arguing that personhood might play 
a robust role in shaping land reform initiatives). 
67 For example, in Guatemala, coffee farms were traditionally operated by the 
families of German immigrants that settled in the highlands and maintained large 
plantations. Since the implementation of Fondo de Tierras, the most recent iteration 
of Guatemalan land reform, many former farmworkers on those same plantations 
are now purchasing the land. The identities of these new smallholders as farmers 
coincides with their burgeoning identities as citizens of a postwar Guatemala, with 
an elected government that does not commit rural genocide. In Zimbabwe, colonial 
expropriation created tenure patterns where white farmers own large farms in 
fertile areas, “while black rural dwellers barely subsist.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 61, at 4. 
68 The scholarship on law and hope is growing, and land reform efforts fit 
squarely as an example of what it means when legal systems not only resolve legal 
wrongs but provide citizens with hope. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in 
the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 319, 346–56, 363–71 (2007) (articulating 
five elements of efforts to cultivate hope in others, including communicating 
recognition and vision, allowing individuation, providing resources, supporting 
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land involves a claim to the nation’s patrimony, that tilling soil is 
an investment in the continued success and prosperity of the 
nation.69  Land ownership and the personal investment of time, 
sweat, and money into its cultivation is proof of social 
citizenship.70  Individuals who work the land under 
postcolonialist circumstances do so in part as a statement of 
autonomy and dignity following years of struggle and oppression. 
Land reform is imbued with expressive meaning, and not 
only for the individual new land owner in postcolonialist nations; 
it also has important expressive meaning for the nation itself.  In 
some instances, when land reform is implemented after years of 
violence or government brutality,71 land reform can serve as a 
form of reparations and provide a clear path forward—not as a 
public airing of truth but as a form of reconciliation 
nonetheless.72  Broadening access to land by government action is 
concrete evidence of the postcolonial identity of the nation as 
independent and capable of economic stability, aligning with a 
shift towards national self-direction and agency as an actor in the 
international arena.  Land reform puts land in the hands of the 
native peoples or their descendants in many countries and is a 
manifestation of the nation’s self-reliance and capability 
following years or perhaps centuries of external rule that 
undermined these capacities.  Democratizing land access and the 
 
agency, and fostering solidarity, as well as identifying Head Start as a programmatic 
effort that uses the law to cultivate hope). 
69 This sense of place and belonging is not unique to the developing world. In 
the United States, the century farm movement identifies and honors farmers who 
can demonstrate that their farm has been in the family for at least 100 years. In 
such instances, land ownership is not only about livelihood but also about identity, a 
sense of place, and “honor[ing] a family’s multi-generational relationship with the 
land.” Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s 
Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 416 (2007). 
70 The failed American postbellum promise of forty acres and a mule—land and 
the materials necessary to work it—is still viewed by rural African Americans as 
demonstrative of the refusal to grant the nation’s patrimony to freed formerly 
enslaved persons. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: 
Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community 
Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 505–06, 
530, 532 (2001). 
71 Guatemala’s most recent land reform was founded as part of the 1996 Peace 
Accords after a thirty-six-year civil war. SUSANNE JONAS, OF CENTAURS AND DOVES: 
GUATEMALA’S PEACE PROCESS 11, 79–80 (2000). South Africa began a serious land 
reform effort at the end of apartheid. WALKER ET AL., supra note 12. 
72 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 91–117 (1998) 
(discussing the importance of reparations after mass human rights atrocities). 
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intensive farming of arable land within a postcolonialist state 
can also lead to complete food autonomy within a nation, or 
realistic steps toward it, exhibiting the nation’s ability to care for 
and increasingly sustain its own people without reliance on 
external assistance. 
Finally, from an international vantage point, land reform 
can offer concrete evidence that the broad anti-poverty efforts of 
transgovernmental organizations like the United Nations 
Development Program73 and nongovernmental organizations like 
the Gates Foundation74 are taking root.  The work of these 
organizations might be best viewed through a theoretical lens 
such as the Capabilities Approach75 or from the vantage of 
Rawlsian justice as fairness.76  They are dedicated to improving 
the lot of the worst-off people in the world, though they do not 
advocate a formal equity in distributing resources throughout 
society.  The anti-poverty initiatives of these kinds of 
organizations exhibit a broadening, worldwide commitment to 
the eradication of extreme poverty and the reduction of poverty 
overall.77  Nations making domestic commitments towards the 
same goals demonstrate that the poorest countries in the world 
are not merely beneficiaries of external international 
development efforts, but are instead agents engaged in a shared 
purpose of improving the standard of living of their poorest 
citizens. 
Of course, these expressive goals are not limitless in their 
scope.  That land is contextual and contingent78 suggests that it 
will continue to mean different things to different people in 
 
73 See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 40, at 3 (“[M]easures and 
analytics are needed that broaden the human development concept. . . . [Human 
development measures] must meet this challenge by moving beyond a focus on 
measuring individual capabilities to incorporate society-level capacities, concerns 
and perceptions. Individual achievements in health, education and income, while 
essential, do not guarantee progress in human development if social conditions 
constrain individual achievements . . . .”). 
74 See What We Do, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
75 See discussion supra Part I.A.3. 
76 See discussion infra Part II.B (considering how redistributive land reform 
fares when analyzed under John Rawls’s approach to justice, articulated in his 
seminal work, A Theory of Justice). 
77 See A World of Development Experience, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html. 
78 For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between land reform and 
the contingent meaning of property, see Cavalieri, supra note 16. 
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different places and times.  Land reform thus can never bear only 
one expressive meaning.  But this should not preclude policy-
makers from contemplating what a land reform program can say 
to all citizens of a nation in addition to what it can do for some 
citizens of a nation.  Indeed, it is possible that the expressive 
message of land reform is broader in its impact within a nation 
than the material effects of the reform.  Respecting expressive 
purposes thus remains an important consideration when shaping 
a land reform initiative and can help analysts understand why a 
particular program may succeed or fail. 
II. MARKET-COMPATIBLE LAND REFORM PROGRAMS: A PRAGMATIC 
LEVEL OF REDISTRIBUTION 
Designed to democratize land access, redistributive land 
reform necessarily involves land changing hands because these 
programs are intended to increase the number of people with 
rights to arable land.79  Land reform accomplishes its many 
important goals80 by creating a new group of people with rights to 
land.  Critics of land reform decry these initiatives as wealth 
redistribution, claiming that such efforts grossly overstep 
permissible government actions.  But these critics assume 
incorrectly that all reallocation of property is unjust.  The 
problem is the imprecision inherent in the term redistribution; 
its meaning is imbued with contempt, but redistribution is a 
common, even pedestrian, government function.81  At the heart of 
this critique is the mistaken assumption that because some 
redistribution of private property might go too far, all 
redistribution is an unwarranted frustration of private property 
rights. 
This Article argues that redistributive land reform can be 
compatible with the operation of a market for land, and 
furthermore that it should be structured to avoid massive 
disruption to the land market in order to most directly reduce the 
 
79 It is of course possible to simply transfer land rights from one party to 
another without increasing the number of people who have access to land. But this 
kind of effort would not democratize access and, therefore, does not qualify as land 
reform in the sense in which the term is used in this Article. 
80 See supra Part I. 
81 Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, 
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 22–23 
(2000). 
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incidence of poverty in the nation.  A market-compatible land 
reform program avoids uncompensated state taking of private 
property, but adopts as necessary compensated eminent domain 
to achieve the public good of democratized access to land.82  While 
uncompensated taking exceeds reasonable bounds because it 
generates externalities that can undermine the goals of land 
reform itself, the kinds of market-compatible land reform 
programs that are the centerpiece of this Article strike an 
appropriate balance, since states are concerned with, and at least 
partially responsible for, the well-being of their people.  This 
Article focuses on land reform programs that avoid 
uncompensated state taking of private property, which I refer to 
as market-compatible land reform programs.  Although 
uncompensated taking warrants its own detailed scholarly 
consideration as a method by which states alter the system of 
land ownership, this Article focuses explicitly on why land reform 
programs designed to further development-based national and 
international goals make sense.  To that end, this Section briefly 
defines expropriation in the context of land reform, explains how 
expropriation runs the risk of undermining land reform as a 
development initiative, and shows how market-compatible land 
reform balances economic efficiency with the achievement of a 
greater degree of equity in a nation. 
To be clear, this Article does not idealize the land market as 
the solution to problems of poverty.  Rather, this Article argues 
that if some market for land is accepted as a given in nations’ 
political arrangements, expropriation can cause economic 
 
82 The distinction drawn here between market compatible land reform programs 
and expropriation-based land reform programs differs from the distinctions 
development scholars often draw among land reform initiatives. Their common 
parlance refers to market-led agrarian reform which relies on market mechanisms to 
provide land to landless people and only distributes “the land of landlords who 
voluntarily sell . . . [. L]andlords who do not want to sell are not compelled to do so.” 
BORRAS, supra note 7, at 54. Elsewhere, this kind of reform is called a willing-buyer, 
willing-seller program. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6. In 
contrast, state-led agrarian reform is coercive land reform in which landlords are 
either unpaid for land taken or are paid at a below market price. See BORRAS, supra 
note 7, at 58. However, this Article departs from this distinction, arguing instead 
that the key for policymakers is to distinguish land reform programs that 
compensate the landlord, which risk less economic destabilization, from land reform 
programs based on uncompensated or undercompensated expropriation. Focusing on 
the maintenance of stability as the key distinction among land reform programs is 
an important contribution that the legal scholarship and its analysis of 
expropriation can make to discussions of land reform. 
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destabilization that disproportionately harms the poorest 
citizens.  This is neither a normative nor a philosophical critique 
of expropriation, but a pragmatic one due to its consequences 
under a certain set of circumstances.  Thus, while this Article 
argues that expropriation is problematic, this is a contextual and 
consequentialist claim based upon expropriation’s ill effects in 
the situation of a system of private property in land.  One could 
envision a different property system in which these consequences 
would not accrue in the same fashion, but that is a different 
project than the one that this Article undertakes.  This Article 
aims to show the most plausible route from the current market 
for land to a robust program of land reform. 
A. Distinguishing Uncompensated Expropriation from 
Compensated Eminent Domain 
Expropriation is the government taking of private property.83  
The term “expropriation” can be imprecise because it does not 
clarify whether or not the government compensates the 
landowner for the taken property.84  For the purposes of this 
Article, the term “expropriation” is used to refer to takings that 
occur without compensation.  Land reform programs can be 
based upon this kind of taking, whereby the state expropriates 
the private property that will be involved in a land reform 
initiative.  Although the power of the sovereign to take property 
has long been considered an inherent aspect of sovereignty,85 
unjustified or uncompensated expropriation today violates the 
 
83 “ ‘[E]xpropriation’ refers to an act by which governmental authority is used to 
deny some benefit of property.” Barry Appleton, Regulatory Takings: The 
International Law Perspective, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 40 (2002). 
84 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 28, at 672 (noting that “[o]utright expropriation 
of property clearly requires compensation” in light of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause). 
85 THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND 
FUTURE INTERESTS 3 (2d ed. 1984) (observing that any act of disloyalty to the throne 
could lead to the loss of one’s land); see also William R. Vance, The Quest for Tenure 
in the United States, 33 YALE L.J. 248, 270 (1924) (describing the powers of the 
sovereign). Additionally, some exercises of government authority over private 
property may serve goals other than land reform. For example, U.S. federal law 
provides for the government to confiscate private property that has been used in 
illegal drug transactions. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012). The critique offered here of 
expropriation is based purely on its use for accomplishing land reform goals in the 
contemporary world and is neither a historical critique of the evolution of the 
sovereign’s power of eminent domain nor a contemporary critique of other reasons 
that a state might confiscate private property. 
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domestic law of many nations86 and international human rights 
norms.87  Under expropriation-based models of land reform, the 
state seizes privately owned land while refusing to compensate 
the owner; it can then redistribute the property by providing 
another individual or group with title or access to the seized 
land.88  In the absence of compensation, the state’s decision to 
expropriate for land reform is simply a choice to exercise its 
sovereign power in favor of certain kinds of owners over other 
kinds of private owners without regard for making the prior 
owners economically whole. 
But expropriation is not the only way that the state can 
obtain land for land reform when the market itself offers 
insufficient property.  The state can exercise its eminent domain 
powers to compel individuals to sell their property to the state.  
Both domestic and international legal systems have provided for 
a model of justified and compensated eminent domain.  Some 
nations’ constitutions have defined permissible justifications for 
the state’s exercise of eminent domain, such as public use89 or 
 
86 For example, the U.S. Constitution provides that “private property [shall not] 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
Similarly, the Spanish Constitution provides that “[n]o one may be deprived of his or 
her property and rights, except on justified grounds of public utility or social interest 
and with a proper compensation in accordance with the law.” CONSTITUCIÓN 
ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3. 
87 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, art. 17, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“(1) Everyone has the right to own property 
alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property.”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, June 27, 
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 248 (“The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the 
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.”); American 
Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 150 
(“(1) Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may 
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. (2) No one shall be 
deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of 
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms 
established by law.”); Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 
262 (entered into force May 18, 1954) (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to 
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law.”). 
88 BORRAS, supra note 7, at 4. See discussion infra Part III, which considers 
these various mechanisms of redistribution. 
89 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
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public interest,90 and have required the payment of just91 or 
fitting92 compensation as well.  When land reform is based on this 
kind of justified compensated exercise of eminent domain, the 
state is again expressing a preference that land title or access be 
provided to a new private owner instead of the prior owner.  But 
the government’s use of the eminent domain power to deprive 
some owners of their property rights in order to bestow those 
private property rights on others also includes an effort to make 
the prior owner financially whole for the loss of the property; this 
process recognizes and attempts to ameliorate the deprivation 
that the prior owner suffers.93 
B. Why Expropriation-Based Land Reform Is Self-Defeating 
While the unlawfulness of expropriation raises legitimate 
legal concerns,94 for this discussion of land reform, expropriation-
based land reform is most problematic because of the ways that it 
undercuts the other key goals of land reform initiatives.95  Land 
reform based on expropriation raises serious risks for nations 
struggling to ensure basic livelihoods for their people, which 
would include the bulk of countries interested or engaged in land 
 
90 C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3 (Spain) (“No one may be 
deprived of his or her property and rights, except on justified grounds of public 
utility or social interest and with a proper compensation in accordance with the 
law.”). 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
92 C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3 (Spain). 
93 Questions about the sufficiency of compensation can muddy this dichotomous 
model. Challenges to the adequacy of compensation indicate that there is a conflict 
about whether the taking is expropriation or an exercise of the state’s powers of 
eminent domain. When the land allocated in land reform is acquired through 
insufficiently compensated eminent domain actions, the resulting program is an 
unfortunate hybrid of expropriation and government-initiated purchase through the 
exercise of eminent domain. To the extent that insufficiently compensated eminent 
domain actions raise the same problems as full-fledged expropriation, this type of 
land reform warrants categorization as a less severe form of expropriation instead of 
a market-compatible variety of land reform. The problems of expropriation are the 
topic of the next Section. 
94 See supra note 87 (discussing the variety of international human rights legal 
norms and domestic laws that bar expropriation without justification or 
compensation). 
95 See supra Part I. It would also be possible to offer a noninstrumentalist 
critique of expropriation which would challenge the state’s refusal to honor private 
property rights, not just the negative externalities that expropriation generates. But 
this approach is extrinsic to the current discussion which is focused on achieving the 
goals of land reform and international development, not on a broader critique of 
government takings of private property. 
FINAL_CAVALIERI 10/21/2015  4:59 PM 
26 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1   
reform initiatives.96  Expropriation provokes individuals’ and 
businesses’ fears of the complete loss of private property to the 
state.  As a result, land reform based on expropriation can 
threaten efforts to encourage outside investment in a nation, as 
private investors are far less likely to begin the kinds of ventures 
that would create economic growth and jobs.97  In the absence of 
security of ownership against government expropriation, 
purchases of real property can be viewed as an irrational 
economic act that few individuals or businesses would be willing 
to undertake.98  Without maintaining confidence that the market 
for land will remain reasonably steady and stable, the looming 
threat of uncompensated expropriation can lead to dramatic 
social upheaval, which benefits neither pre-existing landowners, 
beneficiaries of the land reform program, nor other poor citizens 
in the nation in question. 
The American property law doctrine of marketability of title 
helps elucidate this economic reality.  The central term of any 
American land contract is the clause in which the seller warrants 
that he or she will convey “good and marketable title” to the 
buyer.  Marketable title is “a title that is reasonably free from 
such doubts as will affect the market value of the estate; one 
which a reasonably prudent person with knowledge of all the 
facts and their legal bearing would be willing to accept.”99  In the 
American property system, it is typically viewed as the central 
term of the land contract, such that the failure of the seller to 
convey good and marketable title provides the buyer the right to 
rescind the land contract, among other remedies.100  The key 
insight that the doctrine of marketable title highlights is that 
most property owners prefer land that does not invite litigation 
 
96 The problems discussed in this Section are an accurate portrayal of the 
destabilizing forces of expropriation in the context of a nation with a relatively free 
market for land. Importantly, this kind of property regime is not the only plausible 
system of ownership and titling of land. A nation could embrace a land tenure 
system based upon state-held title and long-term grants of access to individuals 
without providing for private, alienable title to real property. 
97 Bernadette Atuahene, Property Rights & the Demands of Transformation, 31 
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 765, 771–72 (2010). 
98 See id. at 814. 
99 DAVID A. THOMAS, 11-91 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.09(a)(1) 
(Thomas Ed. 2013). 
100 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 776 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
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or the possibility of the loss of the property.101  Expropriation 
raises similar risks, not that title will be challenged by a private 
owner with a paramount claim, but that the state will assert its 
right over the property without making the owner whole.  The 
threat of expropriation thus tarnishes all land transfers, insofar 
as all land in an expropriating nation is held cognizant of the real 
possibility that the land may be lost.102  Where this fear is 
pervasive, it depresses land prices and affects how landholders 
use their property as well. 
Even the looming specter of expropriation thus functions to 
undermine land’s marketability, in the doctrinal sense, 
generating an array of negative concomitant consequences for the 
land market and the entire economy.  Demand for property can 
decline due to the reluctance of potential buyers to make 
purchases they perceive as risky.  This drop in demand can be so 
precipitous as to threaten the operation of a market for the sale 
and purchase of real property.103  Without prices being 
maintained through continued demand for property, the market 
for real property essentially disappears, rendering the land itself 
largely devoid of market value.104  These consequences accrue to 
all landowners, both those who held land prior to the land reform 
and those who were the beneficiaries of the land reform. 
Diminution in the value of land not only affects the present 
operation of the market for land purchases, but also can alter 
how long-term landowners invest in and maintain their 
 
101 India’s 2008 land titling law attempted to account for the issue of security 
and marketability of title by building into conclusive titles a title guarantee that 
“indemnif[ies] the property holder against any losses that may result from 
inaccuracies” in the title system. Sinha, supra note 25, at 20. 
102 Precious Zikhali, Fast Track Land Reform Programme, Tenure Security and 
Investments in Soil Conservation: Micro-Evidence from Mazowe District in 
Zimbabwe, 34 NAT. RESOURCES F. 124, 135 (2010) (comparing perceptions of security 
of tenure of smallholders who received their land through expropriation and who 
held their land based on traditional communal land holdings and observing that 
those who benefited from expropriation believed their own tenure to be far less 
secure). 
103 Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role 
and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1551–52 
(2011) (discussing the decline in capital in the U.S. housing market). 
104 See ROBERT B. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 30–33 (4th 
ed. 2004). Notably, land in a title-insecure nation retains other kinds of value, 
discussed supra in Part I.A., including its crucial role as a contributor to food 
security. 
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property.105  Where expropriation is a threat, owners fear the 
inability to recoup their ongoing reinvestments in the upkeep of 
their land; they therefore will lack one of the primary motives to 
continue improving the condition of their property.106  Even the 
recipients of expropriated land have been shown to question 
whether their title is stable in a nation that legitimates 
expropriation.107  Both long-term owners and beneficiaries of land 
reform might wish to mortgage their property in order to obtain 
capital, either to improve the property or to pursue other goals,108 
but the threat of a pervasive decline in the land market can 
freeze the availability of loans secured by private property.109  
 
105 Economists have posited three distinct ways that land rights are linked to 
investment. First, individuals do not invest if they fear their investments will be 
seized by others. Second, more stable rights make land easier to use as collateral to 
fund improvements. Third, stable rights to alienate property encourage investments. 
See Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and 
Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903, 906–07 (1995); see also Zikhali, supra 
note 102, at 124–25 (describing these three models as the “security argument,” the 
“collateral-based view,” and the “gains-from-trade perspective”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In the United States, one key factor that led to the decline in 
investment following the housing crash was the reduction of funds available through 
home equity lines of credit due to the loss of property value. Thomas J. Cunningham 
et al., Litigation Over the Reduction of Home Equity Lines of Credit: Hickman and 
Beyond, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 35, 35 (2010). 
106 See Nick Dancaescu, Note, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
615, 635 (2003) (“The consequence of attacking a minority . . . may inadvertently be 
that all citizens with property rights ask: what is to stop the government from 
seizing my land? With this fear in their minds, people are less likely to invest capital 
or even sweat equity into the land if their interest is de facto unsecured. Simply put, 
insecurity in land discourages investment in that land, and leads to a meltdown of 
the agribusiness section of a country, and the economy.”). Following the passage of 
laws permitting the government to confiscate lands, set land prices, and prevent 
appeals of compensation paid, MARTIN MEREDITH, MUGABE: POWER AND PLUNDER 
IN ZIMBABWE 122 (2002), one farmer noted, “Farming is a long-term business. If I 
can't be sure that I will still have my land in five to ten years, why should I waste 
my time and money on it?” RUTH WEISS, ZIMBABWE AND THE NEW ELITE 192 (1994) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
107 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 2 (“Even those people allocated 
plots on former commercial farms appear in many cases to have little security of 
tenure on the land, leaving them vulnerable to future partisan political processes or 
eviction on political grounds, and further impoverishment.”). 
108 DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 48. 
109 Ernest Aryeetey & Christopher Udry, Creating Property Rights: Land Banks 
in Ghana, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 130, 130 (2010) (“Insecure property rights reduce the 
ability of borrowers to pledge land as collateral and thus tighten credit 
constraints.”). This reality is not limited to the land reform context. Where the value 
of property is dropping, loans secured by real property become less available, as seen 
in the United States during the Great Recession. Not only was it increasingly 
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Instead of increasing economic equality by raising the relative 
position of landless rural people, expropriation-based land reform 
thus can undermine the entirety of a nation’s economy, 
threatening the economic stability of individuals in all 
socioeconomic strata.110 
Some scholars suggest that these consequences of instability 
are minimized because the benefits of expropriation accrue to the 
most vulnerable who receive the expropriated land;111 this 
approach considers the losses suffered by wealthy individuals to 
be a legitimate means to provide land access for poor people.  But 
this presumption misapprehends how widespread destabilization 
differentially affects members of different social classes.  In 
reality, the wealthy often have the resources to ride out the social 
and economic disruptions that expropriation causes.  The 
destabilizing collateral effects of expropriation disproportionately 
harm the individuals who are the beneficiaries of the land reform 
program.  If the central goal of land reform is to provide land to 
the rural poor as a means of improving those individuals’ 
economic positions and increasing social equality in the state,112 
expropriation devalues the very resource that has been 
transferred to the formerly landless.  In so doing, expropriation 
 
difficult for buyers to obtain purchase-money loans, the availability of home equity 
lines of credit likewise decreased. Cunningham et al., supra note 105. 
110 In Zimbabwe, many of the farms in the most productive agricultural zones of 
the country lie fallow because of the inexperience of the land reform beneficiaries, 
unwillingness to invest in agriculture at a time of hyperinflation, costs of fertilizers 
and diesel, machinery shortages, and departures of experienced farm managers for 
higher wages. These facts, combined with a twenty-five percent HIV/AIDS infection 
rate in the working-age population, now mean that Zimbabwe, once the breadbasket 
of Africa, is struggling to feed its youngest and oldest, who cannot work. See 
Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 577, 579. 
111 Tom Lebert, An Introduction to Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe, in 
PROMISED LAND: COMPETING VISIONS OF AGRARIAN REFORM 40, 54 (Peter Rosset et 
al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter PROMISED LAND]. 
112 Notably, this is not consistently the goal of land reform, particularly land 
reforms conducted for nonpragmatic reasons. In some instances, land reform is 
really a mask for gifts based on political patronage, whereby a party or individual in 
power takes land from members of the opposition, or perhaps persons simply 
uninvolved in the political process, and transfers it to supporters of the party. In 
other situations, the entire expressive purpose of the purported land reform is to 
show the Robin Hood-esque bona fides of the government, taking from the rich 
without compensation and giving to the poor. In still other situations, the 
government might make a show of force against either individuals or business 
interests, demonstrating its own power through its ability to deprive owners of their 
rights to their own property. 
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therefore undermines one central purpose of the land reform 
program itself: offering the advantages of land ownership to 
previously poor individuals.113  Crucial benefits to the new 
landowner, such as the ability to borrow against valuable 
property, are lost when expropriation leads to fundamental 
devaluation of land.114 
Destabilization not only harms landowners, it also causes 
grave consequences for other poor persons in the nation.  In 
many instances, where expropriation reduces investment in and 
cultivation of land,115 food production also decreases, driving up 
food prices and threatening food security within a nation.116  
Although land reform beneficiaries often cultivate their own 
subsistence crops and may not experience hunger as a result of 
the destabilization, expropriation-based land reform can harm 
both the urban and rural poor of a nation who are not the 
recipients of the redistributed land, risking greater overall 
poverty and food insecurity as a cost of the reform.117  Again, 





113 See supra Part I.A (discussing this range of benefits). 
114 As highlighted earlier in Part I.A.2, one of the benefits of land reform can be 
the fact that a title to property provides collateral against which a family might 
borrow, offering a source of capital to previously poor individuals. DE SOTO, supra 
note 5, at 48, 216. Yet even if this benefit of land reform is lost as a consequence of 
expropriation, food security goals can often still be realized. 
115 See Dancaescu, supra note 106; Besley, supra note 105, at 906. 
116 By 2007, following the implementation of widespread expropriation based 
land reform, annual inflation in Zimbabwe reached two thousand two hundred 
percent, and food production was approximately sixty-five percent below food needs 
for the country and thirty-four percent below average production from the prior 
decade. Due to inflation, what little food was available in the food markets was 
priced out of reach for even the average family, and twenty-five percent of 
Zimbabwe’s population was receiving food aid from the United Nations, though this 
aid was at times preferentially distributed as a form of political favoritism for 
Mugabe’s supporters. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 579. 
117 See id. (noting that inflation rendered food unaffordable for the average 
family, not just the very poorest); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61 
(describing how farm workers have been generally excluded from the benefits of land 
redistribution); Medicine Masiiwa, The Fast Track Resettlement Programme in 
Zimbabwe: Disparity Between Policy Design and Implementation, 94 ROUND TABLE 
217, 221–22 (2005) (documenting massive unemployment following Zimbabwe’s 
expropriation-based Fast Track Resettlement Programme because many farms 
stopped hiring farm workers). 
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avoid the worst consequences of this destabilization, whether by 
leaving the country or by spending private funds to smooth over 
the most serious effects to the household economy.118 
To the extent that land reform often, but not always, 
represents one facet of a more general effort towards 
democratization of formerly dictatorial or colonialist regimes, 
expropriation also contravenes the underlying value of individual 
human rights within the nation.119  Where land reform is 
conducted via expropriation, it can still democratize land access 
by broadening the class of landowners to include poor landless 
individuals as well as traditional elites, but through 
undemocratic means.120  In a postcolonial nation that may 
struggle to enact the democratic rule of law, expropriation 
threatens democratic progress in the name of economic 
equality.121  As land reform ideally reflects a shift toward 
democracy, the rejection of individual rights that is inherent in 
expropriation can undermine democratic evolution. 
 
 
118 Political violence has been documented as one consequence of certain models 
of expropriation. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 10. This differential 
ability to respond to social instability is not just about land reform and 
expropriation. Worldwide, poor people lack the resources to care for their families 
when society is upended while their wealthier counterparts can use their own 
wealth to avoid the worst effects of unrest. The crisis situation in Syria presented 
one obvious example of this, whereby wealthy Syrians escaped before the sieges 
began, and the poorest were those trapped by warfare. Ruth Sherlock & Carol 
Malouf, Rich Refugees Pay Thousands To Flee War-Torn Syria in Luxury, 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:28 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/middleeast/syria/10450787/Rich-refugees-pay-thousands-to-flee-war-torn-
Syria-in-luxury.html. 
119 It is for this reason that human rights conventions protect property rights. 
See supra note 87 (identifying various human rights treaties that enshrine some 
protection of the individual’s right to own property). 
120 In Zimbabwe, the earliest forms of postindependence land reform in the 
1980s provided land to the black elite, including ministers, members of parliament, 
senior civil servants, and police and defense officials, who received eight percent of 
the commercial farmland in the country. By 2000, only 75,000 black families had 
been resettled on land reform lands out of a total black population of approximately 
twelve million. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 574–75. 
121 The recent thrust of development efforts has shifted away from demands for 
redistribution, including radical or extensive land reform, and towards governance 
questions. See Moyo, supra note 14, at 197. To the extent that this shift is a real 
change in development priorities, perceptions that land reform undermines 
governance and democratization goals may lessen the already scant support 
available for these programs. 
FINAL_CAVALIERI 10/21/2015  4:59 PM 
32 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1   
Nevertheless, expropriation still has its supporters.  Many 
scholars concerned with the problem of rural poverty in the 
developing world reject the notion of market-compatible land 
reform because it is insufficiently aggressive in addressing 
inequality.122  Instead, they consider expropriation to be the only 
viable source of adequate quantities of land to make a 
meaningful difference in the lives of landless peasants.123  Such 
advocates of expropriation focus on the urgent pursuit of a more 
robust equality and are not concerned about the loss of property 
by the wealthy or with the consequences of expropriation; they 
seek a revolutionary approach to alter land tenure patterns.  
While this Article is sympathetic to the goal of poverty reduction, 
its aspiration is not to design a new market system for land.  
Rather, its purpose is to articulate the benefits of land reform 
and lay out a broadly palatable approach for realizing those 
benefits soon.  As a result, this Article adopts a pragmatic 
orientation toward the land market and accepts that it will 
continue; the Article thus seeks to overcome the worst of rural 
poverty under current market conditions. 
A philosophical examination of this principled demand for a 
more robust model of equality in the distribution of land, 
accomplished through expropriation, also evidences exactly how 
expropriation achieves the wrong balance under current market 
conditions.  Beyond the practical problems just discussed, 
application of John Rawls’s difference principle likewise shows 
why the instability that differentially harms those at the bottom 
of the socioeconomic hierarchy makes expropriation an 
unjustifiable option.  Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness does 
not require formal equality, so long as any inequality does not 
merely improve the social lot of those in privilege, but also 
improves the situation of the least well-off.124  Rawls undoubtedly 
preferred equality, so long as it actually improved the lives of the 
 
122 This was the situation that led to expropriation in Zimbabwe, where first 
generation reforms, requiring willing buyers and willing sellers, and second 
generation reforms, mandating the payment of compensation calculated apart from 
market forces, did not generate sufficient land to provide to poor people. As a result, 
the Fast Track Resettlement Program shifted to a model that did not require 
compensation for seized land. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6. 
123 See Saturnino M. Borras, Jr., The Underlying Assumptions, Theory, and 
Practice of Neoliberal Land Policies, in PROMISED LAND, supra note 111, at 99, 114. 
124 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13 (rev. ed. 1999) (rejecting aggregate 
well-being as the measure of justice). 
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poor.125  But he was concerned that efforts toward formal equality 
would reduce the total well-being of society,126 thereby further 
harming those lacking privilege.127  According to his theory, 
“inequality . . . is permissible only if lowering it would make the 
working class even more worse off.”128  Not all land reform is 
equal if Rawlsian justice is the goal, because while formal 
equality of outcome is not necessary, the program must advance 
the position of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. 
A Rawlsian framework for land reform, therefore, reveals 
important distinctions among different modes of land reform.  A 
land reform program need not mandate a formally equal 
distribution of land divided evenly among all citizens, or even 
undertake a widespread redistribution, to satisfy the difference 
principle.129  In fact, such approaches may violate the difference 
principle if those at the bottom of the hierarchy are rendered 
relatively better off, in comparison to their privileged 
counterparts, but also absolutely worse off, because the amount 
of wealth or privilege available to poor persons has been 
diminished or because the general state of society has changed to 
the detriment of the poor.130  A land reform program must, 
therefore, not only improve the relative position of the poor at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, closing the gap between the rich and the 
poor; it must also improve their absolute position in terms of 
their overall well-being. 
 
125 Id. (“It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order 
that others may prosper.”). 
126 Economists in general have been skeptical of the value of redistribution 
because of its potential inefficiency. See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND 
EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975). But recent scholarship has suggested that 
equality may have an important role in driving higher and more sustainable growth. 
See generally Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE, Feb. 2014, at 1. 
127 RAWLS, supra note 124, at 67–69. 
128 Id. at 68. 
129 See id. 
130 This is not a purely philosophical point. The United Nations Development 
Program (“UNDP”) has rejected the standard development approach which it 
describes as “focused on getting economic fundamentals right as a precondition for 
economic growth, [and] arguing that other human development improvements would 
follow.” UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 40, at 69. In contrast, it 
advocates “[a] human development approach . . . [which] demands that improvement 
in poor people’s lives not be postponed.” Id. Thus, the UNDP also appears to be 
concerned about the distribution of growth, not merely the fact of growth’s 
occurrence, and focused on improving poor people’s lives while economic growth 
happens. 
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This is another version of the concern about the destabilizing 
effects of expropriation.  Expropriation appears, on the face of it, 
to improve the lot of the poor by providing them with land.  But 
the resulting instability not only threatens the well-being of the 
beneficiaries of the land reform program,131 but also the lot of the 
other poor members of society, including the urban poor.132  
Application of the Rawlsian difference principle, which allows for 
continued inequality if its elimination would worsen the 
conditions of life for those at the bottom of the social structure, 
indicates that there are good reasons of justice, not merely 
expediency, to avoid undermining the stability of the economic 
system on the whole.  A Rawlsian approach to land reform, 
therefore, cannot countenance rampant expropriation because 
the negative consequences of the resulting social instability 
would most onerously affect the very poorest in a nation.133  But 
note also that this concern with stability should always favor a 
situation in which the system “maximize[s] the expectations of 
those most disadvantaged.”134  To this end, stability is not a goal 
because the status quo maintains the social position of wealthy 
land owners.  Rather, stability is an acceptable goal only to the 
extent that it prevents even worse harm from accruing to the 
most disadvantaged in the nation.  Land reform may disrupt the 
existing hierarchy insofar as it “maximize[s] the expectations of 
those most disadvantaged”;135 it becomes problematic if it causes 
destabilization so extensive that it renders them worse off. 
C. Market-Compatible Land Reform Balances Land-Reform 
Goals and Economic Stability 
For these many reasons, both practical and philosophical, 
expropriation-based land reform goes too far in its redistributive 
efforts.  Due to these problems that result from expropriation, 
this Article focuses instead on land reform efforts conducted 
through market-compatible mechanisms, which this Article 
 
131 Masiiwa, supra note 117 (documenting that the local currency sharply 
depreciated and inflation sharply increased following the expropriation based Fast 
Track Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe). 
132 Id. at 221 (documenting that following the expropriation based Fast Track 
Resettlement Programme, the resulting decline in agricultural production led to a 
substantial increase in food shortages in Zimbabwe). 
133 RAWLS, supra note 124, at 68. 
134 Id. at 70. 
135 Id. 
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defines as those based on methods consistent with the stable 
operation of a market for land within the nation.  The key 
characteristic of a market-compatible land reform is that the 
uncompensated loss of private property is not the source of the 
land that is subject to redistribution. 
Avoiding expropriation is crucial because market-compatible 
land reform is far more likely to maintain a critical level of social 
stability, in which individuals and businesses remain willing to 
invest in land because they do not fear that the government will 
take it for the government’s own ends.  Market-compatible land 
reform allows the beneficiaries of a land reform effort security in 
their right to land in the foreseeable future, thereby increasing 
their willingness to expend the money and effort to improve their 
land.  The resulting social stability benefits current landowners 
and the beneficiaries of land reform, as just described, as well as 
poor persons outside of the land reform system whose lives are 
not disrupted by social upheaval. 
A land reform initiative that values the maintenance of 
stability in the land market would be predicated on either private 
sales, whether subsidized or not, or the state’s exercise of 
compensated eminent domain.  Under market-compatible 
conditions, localities, regions, or nations that decide to 
implement land reform are making a fundamentally rational 
economic decision based on careful cost-benefit analysis.  In the 
instance of a private transaction facilitated by the state, the land 
reform beneficiary will only decide to buy if the benefits of land 
rights are worth the price paid.136  If the buyer’s purchase is 
subsidized by the state, then the state is making a calculation 
that the reform’s benefits to the state are worth the cost of 
paying the subsidy for the property.137  If the state is the 
purchaser, with the intention of giving land to beneficiaries, then 
again, the state is determining that the purchase is worthwhile.   
 
 
136 See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of these mechanisms of land 
reform. 
137 This model raises some questions because it shields the land reform 
beneficiary, who may put up part of the money, from the complete cost of the 
decision to acquire the property. Under these facts, such a buyer may be insulated 
from making a thorough cost-benefit analysis since the buyer does not contemplate 
the entire price of the property when deciding whether to purchase it only partially 
with personal resources. This is not a strong argument against subsidizing land 
reform programs but rather a simple observation of one of its potential downsides. 
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As described above, only in a relatively stable market will buyers 
be willing to invest their money in land—this is the key insight 
that animates the doctrine regarding the marketability of title. 
The allocation of the benefits and harms of land reform is 
one of the key reasons why a market-compatible approach is a far 
more desirable means to achieve the goals of land reform138 than 
an expropriation-based approach.  Expropriation decouples the 
risks of governmental takings of property from the benefits of 
those actions.  Where expropriation drives land reform, the 
myriad benefits of land reform accrue to the recipients of the 
land, who do not suffer an immediate loss, and to the state, 
which gains a measure of populist credibility.  But under these 
same circumstances, neither the beneficiaries of the land reform 
nor the state put any financial skin in the game.  Instead of 
spending either the beneficiaries’ private financial resources or 
funds from the public fisc to obtain land for transfer, the costs of 
the land reform are all borne by the owner whose property the 
state expropriated while the benefits remain with the recipient 
and the state.  This can make land reform appear peculiarly 
attractive to the state, since under these circumstances it only 
stands to benefit from a program on which it expends no state 
funds. 
In contrast, market-compatible land reform unifies the 
benefits and risks of land reform in the same parties.  In  
market-compatible land reform, land is obtained by either a 
private group of individuals purchasing the land for their own 
use, the government purchasing the land to distribute to citizens 
through gift or purchase, or a hybrid purchase funded jointly by 
the beneficiaries and the state.  In any of these cases, the prior 
owner is compensated.  Consequently, the purchaser must decide 
whether the best use of the available funds is to purchase land, 
or for other possible uses.  The land reform should only occur 
where the purchasers view the benefits of the purchase as 
meeting or exceeding the cost of obtaining the land.  If the 
potential benefits of the land reform do not meet or exceed the 
actual monetary costs of implementation, it thereby follows that 
the purchase should not occur.139 
 
138 See supra Part I for an exhaustive discussion of the goals of land reform. 
139 Land reform also might create sufficient positive externalities that the state 
could encourage and support the purchases, even if the private benefit to the 
beneficiary is less than the purchase price. Much like domestic investments in Head 
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This is of course the economically rational course of action 
which may not be followed as people and states are not perfectly 
rational actors.140  But even if an irrational purchase is made 
without a clear cost-benefit analysis—such as where the state 
and the beneficiary each pay part of the cost so neither conducts 
a complete cost-benefit analysis—it does not decouple the 
benefits and the harms of the conveyance.  The risks and benefits 
are still unified in the state and the beneficiary, both of whom 
pay some money and achieve some of their goals.  As a result, 
though poorly designed programs may still exist, by avoiding 
expropriation, the appearance of costlessness will not encourage 
the state to take private property. 
But the most legally interesting land reform scenario occurs 
when the land reform program suffers for want of land to 
distribute, usually because the owners of property appropriate 
for redistribution do not wish to sell their land.  In such 
moments, one option would be for the state to simply postpone 
land reform, deferring to the desires of private owners to decide 
whether they want to sell or not.  This can undermine the 
purposes of a land reform effort.141  The other primary option 
would be for the state to conclude that privately owned land 
should be distributed in contravention of the wishes of the 
individual owner who does not wish to sell.  This outcome could 
be accomplished by expropriation, but for the reasons explored 
above, the preferable alternative that maintains economic 
stability is for the state to exercise its eminent domain powers 
against a landowner who is unwilling to sell.  Again, that the 
state or beneficiaries must pay money means they bear both the 
risk and the benefit, reducing the likelihood of unwarranted risk-
taking.  The key question is how such a transaction can be 
structured in a market-compatible fashion that does not 
destabilize the land market specifically and the economy 
generally. 
 
Start, for example, which generate substantial returns on investment throughout 
the lives of children who participate, land reform may similarly generate returns 
over a long period of time. 
140 The basic presumption of economics is that all actors behave in an 
economically rational fashion. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 104, at 3. This 
presumption has of course been broadly critiqued. 
141 To the extent the program is based upon the desire of the state to accomplish 
the goals set out in Part I, the failure to obtain sufficient land for the program can 
frustrate a valuable purpose. 
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D. Eminent Domain Jurisprudence Generates 
Market-Compatible Land Reform 
The market-compatible land reform proposed here is rooted 
in a variety of existing eminent domain frameworks.  
International human rights norms’ approaches to protecting 
private property rights against the state’s exercise of eminent 
domain are fashioned to try to reach this outcome.  The American 
Convention on Human Rights strikes this balance by providing 
that while individuals have “the right to the use and enjoyment” 
of their property, “[t]he law may subordinate such use and 
enjoyment to the interest of society.”142  However, this 
subordination can only occur under specific circumstances.  First, 
the taking must be reimbursed by the “payment of just 
compensation.”143  Second, the taking must be justified as serving 
“public utility or social interest.”144  Third, the deprivation must 
be done “in the cases and according to the forms established by 
law.”145 
Likewise, domestic laws of various nations require that 
takings must be compensated and justified as well.  The Spanish 
Constitution seeks a similar equilibrium by requiring takings to 
be justified on “grounds of public utility or social interest and 
with a proper compensation in accordance with the . . . law.”146  
The U.S. Constitution also offers its own analogous approach 
requiring justification and compensation.  The Fifth Amendment 
takings doctrine states that the government shall not take 
private property except for public use. 147  Even when the public 
use rule is satisfied, the government still must provide just 
compensation to the owner whose land has been taken.148 
Understanding the operation of Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence offers an example of how market-compatible land 
reform options strike their careful economic balance.  The state 
must justify its exercise of eminent domain as serving a public 
use, which is defined broadly as a use validated by the legislature 
 
142 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 87. 
143 Id. art. 21(2). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3. 
147 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
148 Id. 
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as serving the good of the general public.149  The just 
compensation requirement obligates the government to pay the 
fair market value of the taken property, which in theory is the 
same as what the private owner would have received had the 
property been sold on the private market.150  The Fifth 
Amendment, therefore, sets up a process in which the 
government must actually decide whether the expenditure of 
funds on land is a worthwhile use of public monies to serve the 
good of the public, as compared to other possible uses of the same 
funds.  To the extent that the public fisc is not bottomless, 
economic reality will always limit the kinds of takings that the 
government can realistically pursue, even for properly 
articulated public uses. 
The United States Supreme Court’s only land reform case 
suggests how this model of justified, compensated eminent 
domain as the source of property for land reform plays out in 
practice.151  In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,152 the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld a land reform initiative in Hawaii that 
permitted condemnations and transfers of ownership of 
residential property from landlords to tenants “in order to reduce 
the concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State.”153  
The Court determined that this kind of land reform satisfied the 
public use doctrine because through this program, “[t]he people of 
Hawaii . . . attempted . . . to reduce the perceived social and 
economic evils of a land oligopoly.”154  In so holding, the Court 
concluded that this program did not merely further the interests 
 
149 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1954); see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (noting that this definition is expansive and highly 
deferential to the legislature) (“The ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous 
with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”). 
150 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (stating that fair market 
value means that the owner should be paid “what a willing buyer would pay in cash 
to a willing seller”). But see United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 
121, 123 (1950) (“[W]hen market value has been too difficult to find, or when its 
application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public, courts have 
fashioned and applied other standards.”). 
151 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 230–31. 
152 467 U.S. 229. 
153 See id. at 231–32, 241–42. 
154 Id. at 241–42; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 
U.S. 407, 422 (1992) (citations omitted) (citing Midkiff approvingly for holding that 
transferring ownership of land from one private party to another in order to reduce 
the oligarchic control of property satisfies the public use requirement of the Takings 
Clause). 
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of some individuals, but accomplished a social good by reducing 
the harms of oligopoly, even though the state conveyed the land 
from one private individual to another.155 
Further consideration of Midkiff reveals how land reform 
can satisfy the conditions of market-compatibility.  Exercising 
eminent domain over property for a public use justifiable under 
the Fifth Amendment is only a rational state action if the 
benefits from the taking are worth the amount of the obligatory 
just compensation that must be paid for such a program to 
survive constitutional scrutiny.  Because the government must 
pay to exercise eminent domain, it only does so if the land reform 
is a worthwhile public policy action as compared to competing 
government priorities.  This is about more than the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—it is also about all other 
market-compatible land reforms in other countries.  The same 
economic reality should logically control whether those nations 
undertake market-compatible land reform, even if their 
constitutions do not require this approach.  If the government 
wishes to obtain land to do land reform and hopes to avoid 
destabilizing the economy, but the open market lacks the 
necessary property, it needs to compensate the prior owners 
rather than expropriating land to redistribute.  When it does so, 
the government is making a fundamentally rational economic 
decision; the government only does this after performing a  
cost-benefit analysis in which the nation considers whether it is 
worth spending public monies to dismantle the concentration of 
land in the hands of relatively few people.156 
As a result, market-compatible land reform differs 
significantly from the uncompensated land seizures that typify 
expropriation.  For market-based land reform to occur, the 
government makes a public decision that the financial hit to the 
public fisc is a worthwhile investment of public resources, a 
private actor performs the same calculus, or both decide to act 
and expend resources in a cooperative purchase.  This suggests 
 
155 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42. 
156 The only residual question is the justification process. Without having a legal 
obligation to justify the purchase for the good of the public, it is possible that the 
state could choose to obtain land for purposes that are unjustified from a democratic 
standpoint. However, this is a problem for compensated eminent domain in general, 
not just for land reform. Land reform designed to destroy oligopoly is justified on 
this basis, as the U.S. Supreme Court found in Midkiff. See id. 
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that there is a substantial difference between the kinds of 
expropriation that create public alarm and market-compatible 
reform that provides opportunities for citizens to become  
small-scale landowners while still maintaining economic 
stability. 
E. Market-Compatible Land Reform Is Consistent with Central 
Government Functions 
The primary remaining critique of the kinds of land reform 
programs here espoused is that these more modest,  
market-compatible approaches still go too far.  Even the kind of 
land reform programs central to this Article have been criticized 
as instances of excessive government intervention that come too 
close to functioning as uncompensated taking of private 
resources for public purposes157—in essence, as a form of 
redistribution that goes too far, much like expropriation is 
redistribution that goes too far.158 
The reality is that redistribution is one of the primary 
functions of the modern nation.  While such programs are the 
subject of critique by those who reject the idea of taxing some 
citizens to provide for the needs of others,159 they are extremely 
common and can be viewed as part of a nation’s effort to ensure a 
basic quality of life to its people.160  Public resources are used 
worldwide to provide for education, health care, food, and income 
for individuals who cannot provide these necessities for 
themselves; these goods are the substance of essential human 
rights to which most countries have agreed their citizens are 
entitled.161  Taxation to support any public good is, after all, 
redistribution.  Tax-supported standing armies provide for the 
public good of national defense; tax-supported diplomatic corps 
 
157 M. RIAD EL-GHONEMY, THE CRISIS OF RURAL POVERTY AND HUNGER 30–31 
(2007) (discussing sources of neoliberal critique of redistributionary land reform 
programs). 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 See Fineman, supra note 81. 
161 See Helen Clark, Foreword to UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra 
note 40, at iv (“[E]conomic growth alone does not automatically translate into 
human development progress. Pro-poor policies and significant investments in 
people’s capabilities—through a focus on education, nutrition and health, and 
employment skills—can expand access to decent work and provide for sustained 
progress.”). See generally ICESCR, supra note 47. 
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provide for the public good of international negotiation and 
conflict resolution.  Such functions are redistributive; without 
taxation to support them, the wealthy could privately finance 
defense or diplomacy, and the poor and middle classes would be 
left without these services.  Although some might assert that 
there is a difference between redistribution to allocate greater 
resources to some private interest and redistribution to allocate 
funds to a public good, whenever the former involves achieving 
positive externalities for the whole of society, it becomes a public 
good.  Such is the case for market-compatible land reform. 
The purpose of this Article is not to offer a defense of the 
modern welfare state.  But to the extent that the other linchpins 
of the modern welfare state are considered to be legitimate, this 
Article argues that land reform properly deserves a place with 
other widely accepted social insurance and support programs.  If 
one accepts redistribution for goods, such as education, food, or 
health care, or of the proceeds of taxation through national 
defense, it is illogical to reject redistributive efforts whose 
beneficiaries receive land, provided that the redistribution of the 
land reform does not go too far, which is avoided in the model 
just described. 
III. THE MANY FORMS OF CONTEMPORARY LAND REFORM 
PROGRAMS 
Redistributive aspects of land reform programs typically 
serve to democratize access to the agricultural lands of a country, 
by providing land rights to previously landless individuals or 
groups.  Yet that this Article has thus far focused on arguing for 
the validity and usefulness of a market-compatible redistributive 
land reform masks the fact that such reforms can take myriad 
shapes.  It further hides important distinctions among land 
reform programs that may be connected to their ultimate success 
or failure.  Building a typology of market-compatible land reform 
initiatives accomplishes two main ends.  It offers clarification of 
the robustness of the market-compatible model, which is not a 
one-size-fits-all policy approach, but rather a wide array of 
possible adaptations of a program to meet government mandate 
and national need in states around the world.  Additionally, it 
suggests that those working to initiate a land reform initiative 
can shape its future success by customizing the program within 
the umbrella of market-compatibility. 
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The characteristics of such programs can be mapped along 
four central axes.  First, programs can vary according to the 
means by which land rights are transferred to a new party via 
gift or purchase.  Second, land reform programs differ based on 
whether the right created is access or title to land.  Third, the 
beneficiaries can hold this right individually or collectively.  
Fourth, the state can play an array of different roles in 
facilitating the transfer of land.  Each of these dimensions is 
continuous, rather than binary—in other words, a particular land 
reform program could be situated, relative to other programs, on 
each measure according to its key characteristics.  The 
combination of these four factors produces a fairly comprehensive 
operational description of a land reform program.  The level of 
public support for a particular land reform and, relatedly, the 
possibility of controversy surrounding it, and potentially 
undermining its success, correspond to these central traits of 
land reform programs. 
A. Beneficiaries Can Receive Land Rights by Gift or Purchase 
In some cases, conveyances of land involved in land 
democratization efforts take the form of purchase, with 
beneficiaries buying land either from a private owner or from the 
state162 with any of a number of levels of state assistance.163  In 
other instances, the state can make a gift of land rights to the 
new owner, without requiring the new owner to pay for the right 
received.  In the most complex cases, the conveyance involves a 
combination of a gift and a purchase.  In these situations, the 
state can absorb part of the purchase price of the land,164 either 
by paying or forgiving part of the principal of the loan.  Likewise, 
a loan that the government subsidizes at below-market rates can 
also be considered a form of a gift and purchase combination, 
with the state providing a gift of an interest rate subsidy on what  
 
 
162 State purchase and then resale to land reform beneficiaries was one of the 
tenets of Guatemala’s recent land reform. JONAS, supra note 71. 
163 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
164 In the case of the community of La Florida in Guatemala, the government 
provided the community with a relatively low-interest loan and then forgave 
approximately thirty percent of the loan principal at the time of initiation. Interview 
with Community Board of La Florida (June 17, 2010). 
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would otherwise be a more costly, market-rate loan.165  The key 
distinction here is who is paying for the right obtained: the state, 
the beneficiary, or both parties together. 
B. Beneficiaries Can Receive Title or Access to Land 
Land reform programs can provide land to beneficiaries 
based on titular rights or access rights.  In many instances, land 
reform programs help individuals gain formal legal title to 
property.166  These beneficiaries hold their rights to the land in 
what American property scholars might refer to as fee simple 
absolute.  In some cases, the state may restrict the right of these 
fee simple owners to alienate the property.  In other cases, the 
land is alienable, whether immediately or after some waiting 
period designed to prevent land reform from serving as a quick 
cash scheme. 
It is also possible for land reform to occur without formally 
conveying title to new owners.167  In these cases, democratization 
of rights to arable land can be accomplished through provision of 
access, but not title, to property.168  The state would typically 
retain the title, permitting individuals to farm state lands.169  In 
 
165 Susana Gauster & S. Ryan Isakson, Eliminating Market Distortions, 
Perpetuating Rural Inequality: An Evaluation of Market-Assisted Land Reform in 
Guatemala, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1519, 1520–21 (2007) (noting the necessity of 
subsidized lending to provide purchase money to poor Guatemalan farmers who are 
not creditworthy). Most home purchases in the United States could also be 
characterized as falling into this category, as backing by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
likewise reduces interest rates. See About Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, FED. 
HOUSING FIN. AUTHORITY, http://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/FannieMae 
andFreddieMac/Pages/About-Fannie-Mae---Freddie-Mac.aspx (“By packaging 
mortgages into [mortgage backed securities] and guaranteeing the timely payment 
of principal and interest on the underlying mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
attract to the secondary mortgage market investors who might not otherwise invest 
in mortgages, thereby expanding the pool of funds available for housing. That makes 
the secondary mortgage market more liquid and helps lower the interest rates paid 
by homeowners and other mortgage borrowers.”). 
166 As the formalization of individual titles to property is often another goal of 
land reform, see discussion supra Part I.A.2., generation of formal title pursuant to 
redistribution can serve these two goals of agrarian reform simultaneously. 
167 Winoto, supra note 6, at 6 (describing how peasants historically accessed 
land by tenancy or customary tenure, not ownership). 
168 Id. 
169 This is distinct from a leasehold with the state as landlord and the farmer as 
tenant; these rights involve formalized access without paying rent. PIERO 
GLEIJESES, SHATTERED HOPE: THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTION AND THE UNITED 
STATES, 1944–1954, at 151 (1991) (describing life tenure on state owned lands, with 
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granting a right to cultivate a specific tract of land without 
holding title, the resulting land reform initiative separates 
ownership rights from usage rights.170  Where this occurs, 
individuals may not obtain some of the key benefits associated 
with property ownership, such as the ability to mortgage 
property for purposes of obtaining loans.171  Yet this kind of 
arrangement can offer many of the food security172 and poverty 
reduction benefits that land reform ideally provides for landless 
peasants.173  Modern states are also considering more creative 
hybrids of title and access rights, such as the registration of land 
certificates that formalize local tenure practices and can be sold 
or used as collateral but are not recognized by the state as 
carrying the significance of a title.174 
C. Beneficiaries Can Hold Land Rights Individually or 
Collectively 
Land reform programs can also differ on the basis of how 
recipients of land hold their rights.  In many instances, land 
reform initiatives provide land on an individual basis, permitting 
individual owners or families to obtain title or access to small 
 
trivial payments of three percent of farm output per year for twenty-five years 
following parcelization). 
170 Put another way, some land reform initiatives separate certain incidents of 
ownership from the traditional bundle of rights and bestow them on parties other 
than the title owner. Vance, supra note 85 (stating that absolute ownership in the 
Anglo-American law of real property consists of a “bundle of rights, powers, 
privileges and immunities”). While common American perceptions of property rights 
center on individual ownership, access rights without title are not entirely foreign in 
the American context. Recent scholarship has documented the rise of sharing 
economy programs through which individuals use others’ property without gaining 
title, such as car sharing initiatives. James A. Kushner, Car-Free Housing 
Developments: Towards Sustainable Smart Growth and Urban Regeneration 
Through Car-Free Zoning, Car-Free Redevelopment, Pedestrian Improvement 
Districts, and New Urbanism, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2005) (“Although 
the concept appears anathema to American culture, car-sharing activity has 
increased in the U.S.”). 
171 For further discussion of this point, see supra Part I.A.2. 
172 “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” AMNESTY INT’L, ZIMBABWE: 
POWER AND HUNGER—VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD (2004), available at 
https://www.amnesty.ie/reports/zimbabwe-power-and-hunger-–-violations-right-food. 
173 See supra Part I.A.1. 
174 See Delville, supra note 27, at 28–29 (describing this system in Benin and 
noting that it is a hybrid between a formal, title-driven land system and the system 
of local or customary rights to land). 
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tracts of land for their own use.175  These approaches most 
resemble dominant modern norms of property ownership,176 with 
individuals, nuclear families, or perhaps extended family units 
holding rights autonomously. 
Efficiency concerns may justify deviating from these norms 
in the design of land reform.  Because lands that are 
redistributed have often been used for large-scale commercial 
production, the property may not be easily susceptible to 
cultivation by individual smallholders.177  In some instances, this 
is because the parcel covers a variety of terrain with some 
portions appropriate for cultivation of commercial crops or 
grazing of animals, other sections suitable for small-scale 
subsistence production of staple food, and other segments 
offering infrastructure such as housing, roads, or crop processing 
and storage facilities.178  Given that individual recipients of 
property through land reform may want access to land for all of 
these purposes, including use of the centralized infrastructure 
and facilities, dividing an existing plantation and generating 
individual title to small tracts of land may not be the most 
efficient approach. 
Furthermore, existing large-scale infrastructure may be 
essential for cultivation.  For example, in many arid places in the 
world, complex irrigation systems or chemical inputs make 
cultivation possible; in the absence of large-scale coordination to 
make these supports available, productive farming may be 
difficult.179  In other cases, while the land may be cultivable on a 
 
175 GLEIJESES, supra note 169, at 150, 160 (describing parceling of land and the 
rejection of collectivization as contrary to the land tenure practices in Guatemala in 
the 1940s). 
176 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243, 1244 (1968) (explaining the modern preference for individual title). 
177 “Smallholder” is a term used commonly in the development literature to refer 
to individuals who cultivate small tracts of land. See generally ROBERT MCC. 
NETTING, SMALLHOLDERS, HOUSEHOLDERS: FARM FAMILIES AND THE ECOLOGY OF 
INTENSIVE, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE (1993). 
178 The community of La Florida in Guatemala uses the former plantation house 
as a guesthouse for its ecotourism business and has maintained all of the centralized 
facilities for processing and storage of coffee. Interview with Community Board of La 
Florida, June 17, 2010. 
179 In 1986, prior to the implementation of Zimbabwe’s land reform programs, 
Zimbabwe’s grain production alone was sufficient to compensate for the 1.6 million 
ton shortfall of eighteen sub-Saharan African countries. After the more radical 
reforms of the late 1990s, access to inputs was lost. Zimbabwe’s commercial farmers 
who lost their land in the late 1990s could have fed Zimbabwe and “many of the 
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small scale, large-scale mechanized facilities on the property 
permit farmers to process their agricultural products, adding 
value by generating a processed, market-ready crop instead of an 
unprocessed raw material.180  Farmers with access to such 
facilities are able to obtain higher prices for their commodity 
crops, since they internalize additional steps in the processing of 
the crop and reduce the number of actors to be paid for 
performing discrete steps in the production of the commodity.181 
In some cultures, traditional patterns of land tenure have 
involved communities exercising their land rights collectively.182  
Customary land rights in many parts of the world have evolved 
in parallel with systems of formal titling; these customary rights 
are based on local practices and administration, but not formal 
rules and processes for registering legal claims of rights to 
property.183  When indigenous groups or other organizations of 
people are the beneficiaries of land reform, generating land 
rights in a collective fashion is consistent with existing land 
usage practices and may produce desirable efficiencies.184  The 
traditional Mexican ejido system offers one example of land 
reform in which individuals receive access rights and 
communities hold titular rights.185 
 
millions of people risking starvation in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and 
Swaziland.” See Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 573. 
180 For example, large coffee plantations include centralized processing facilities 
for depulping, fermenting, drying, and milling coffee, resulting in green coffee, which 
is a stable commodity ready for shipping. Stephen G. Bunker, Coffee and the 
Guatemalan State, in GLOBALIZATION ON THE GROUND: POSTBELLUM GUATEMALAN 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 129, 138–40 (Christopher Chase-Dunn et al. eds., 
2001). 
181 Rick Welsh, Farm and Market Structure, Industrial Regulation and Rural 
Community Welfare: Conceptual and Methodological Issues, 26 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 
21, 22 (2009). 
182 S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: 
A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002). 
183 See Delville, supra note 27, at 29. 
184 In some instances, this model runs into conflict with the role of the state in 
redistributing land because the power to assign land access has been a key aspect of 
local, often traditional, authorities in the conduct of customary tenure models. Moyo, 
supra note 14, at 189. 
185 William D. Signet, Grading a Revolution: 100 Years of Mexican Land Reform, 
16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 481, 515–17 (2010) (describing post-Revolution ejido land, and 
restrictions on alienation and mortgaging). Contemporary American Indian tribal 
land is often held in this model. The tribe holds all rights to the property consistent 
with fee simple ownership but subject to “an absolute restraint on alienation to 
every grantee other than the United States.” SINGER, supra note 28, at 762. The 
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As a result of these characteristics inherent in certain forms 
of agricultural production or resulting from historic land usage 
patterns, holding title in some collective manner may be 
preferable to individual title.  Collective forms of title are 
complex and varied; they can take forms as simple as a loose 
association of individuals who are affiliated for practical 
purposes, appear as complex as a formal cooperative structure in 
which individuals hold shares in a collective entity, or assume a 
variety of other, locally determined models.186  There are also 
differences in how that owner collective functions as a legal 
entity in the state.187  What rights the individual maintains 
within the collective can also distinguish forms of collective 
ownership.  In some situations, individuals may be able to sell 
their property on the open market,188 while in other cases, the 
title may bar individuals from selling their shares of the 
property.189  Where title is held collectively but private individual 
sale is barred, individual rights are analogous to those in 
situations where the state grants access to state-owned property; 
the individual possesses rights of use and access without holding 
the right of market alienation.190 
 
tribe can distribute usage rights among its members and otherwise protect 
individuals’ property rights to the use of that land, but individuals likewise cannot 
alienate the property since they hold subject to the tribal title. Id. However, the 
rights of American Indians to exercise authority and jurisdiction over Indian 
Country continues to be influenced by the repudiated U.S. policy of allotment, see 
Tweedy, supra note 29, at 137–39, in which the United States “attempt[ed] to 
forcibly assimilate Indians by breaking up tribal land holdings and distributing 
allotments of the land to individual Indians,” who thereby gained the right to 
alienate their allotments of previously tribal land. Id. at 133. 
186 These models of collective ownership are susceptible to many of the typical 
critiques of common property ownership. See generally Hardin, supra note 176. 
Individual communities have crafted interventions to resolve some of these 
problems, such as informal division of the land for purposes of cultivation and 
residence, with collective processing and use of common facilities. 
187 See Delville, supra note 27, at 28–40 (discussing customary land rights and 
observing that such rights often have complex, collective aspects). 
188 Since 1992, Mexican law has permitted voluntary privatization by ejidos, if 
its members wish to do so. The decision is left with individuals about whether to 
privatize their share or not, but other ejido members have a preferential right to 
purchase. Signet, supra note 185, at 524–25. This model is similar to co-op 
apartment buildings in New York City, which permit individual owners to buy and 
sell their apartments as shares in the building. 
189 SINGER, supra note 28, at 762 (stating that individual American Indians who 
possess usage rights to tribal lands lack the right to alienate). 
190 In these cases, formal conveyance occurs from the state or a private owner to 
a collective entity, such as an ethnic group or cooperative. The members of that 
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D. State Involvement Can Range from Minimal to Extensive 
It is the state’s role in land reform that can most crucially 
shape the success of the land reform initiative and the long-term 
stability of the nation in which the reform is occurring.191  State 
involvement in redistributing land can vary widely across a 
whole continuum of interventions differing in their public 
legitimacy.  At the simplest level, the state could serve as a 
facilitator of private transfer, operating as a clearinghouse to 
organize landless individuals to collectively purchase a 
plantation and helping to connect would-be buyers with willing 
sellers.192  The state could either itself offer or contract with 
outside organizations to provide technical support to landless 
individuals so that once they become the beneficiaries of a land 
reform program, the formerly landless are more likely to succeed 
as farmers.193  Alternatively, the state can provide subsidized 
loans to buyers or loan guarantees to help buyers obtain loans on 
the private market.194  In a more robust land reform initiative, 
the state might combine these and other possibilities in creative 
ways to try to increase the likelihood that a particular individual 
or group will succeed in farming, by helping to provide both 
rights to land and the technical knowledge necessary to operate a 




collective obtain the right to cultivate or otherwise use land but personally receive 
none of the other rights of control or management of the property; they might 
exercise these rights as members of the collective body but not autonomously as 
individual land owners. Signet, supra note 185 (describing historical ejido practices 
in Mexico). 
191 Winoto, supra note 6, at 13. 
192 Though this model would be possible, because of the typical goal of land 
reform programs to transfer lands to poor persons, such programs usually lack the 
private resources necessary to purchase property independently. 
193 Indonesia has included access to agricultural inputs and other needed 
assistance as part of its program to change the structure of agrarian ownership. 
Winoto, supra note 6, at 6–7. Guatemala’s most recent land reform program, Fondo 
de Tierras, adopted this approach, offering the services of agronomists to help 
farmers. Gauster & Isakson, supra note 165, at 1524 (discussing marketing and 
technical assistance). 
194 Guatemala’s most recent land reform program provided subsidized loans to 
beneficiaries of its recent land reform initiative. Gauster & Isakson, supra note 165, 
at 1523. 
195 Zikhali, supra note 102, at 126 (farmer support services). 
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In another model of state support, the state could transfer 
public land to private landless individuals.  This property could 
be land that is already public.196  Or it could be idle or abandoned 
parcels that are unclaimed.197  It is also possible that the state 
instead could obtain privately held land with the intent to 
provide it to land reform beneficiaries.  In some instances, this 
could occur through a free market negotiation.198  In other cases, 
it could involve the use of various state powers to incentivize the 
sale or donation of land.199  Or, the property could be obtained 
through an exercise of eminent domain to take land that is 
privately held, with just compensation paid for the property in 
question, combined with a future conveyance to other private 
individuals.200  Finally, the state could obtain the land by  
 
 
196 GLEIJESES, supra note 169, at 151 (describing the redistribution of national 
plantations during the post-Revolution land reform). 
197 Winoto, supra note 6, at 7 (optimizing use of idle land is a central aspect of 
Indonesia’s land reform program). 
198 The original postindependence land reform program in Zimbabwe set out to 
purchase land from white farmers in voluntary transactions using funds from the 
international community through the willing buyer, willing seller model. HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6; Zikhali, supra note 102, at 125. 
199 One obvious example of this would be to tax fallow land more heavily than 
productively cultivated land. Such a taxation regime would either incentivize owners 
to return land to productive use, thereby increasing employment opportunities in 
rural areas, or to sell fallow property, which would increase the amount of land 
available for redistribution through land reform efforts. In the United States, the 
modern land bank serves an analogous purpose. In the passive land bank model, 
land banks can act as holding entities for abandoned properties. Thomas J. 
Fitzpatrick IV, Understanding Ohio’s Land Bank Legislation, FED. RES. BANK 
CLEVELAND POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPERS, Jan. 2009, at 1, 2, available at 
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/Newsroom%20and%20Events/Publications/Disconti
nued%20Publications/Policy%20Discussion%20Papers/pdp%200925%20understandi
ng%20ohios%20land%20bank.aspx. Or, land banks can adopt a more proactive 
approach by actively using tax foreclosures to acquire vacant or abandoned land. Id. 
at 5, 7. By clearing tax liens, providing low-cost properties to productive users, and 
returning property to the productive tax rolls, the active land bank model can 
similarly help facilitate the transfer of privately held property. Id. at 2. 
200 This is what occurred in the one case on land reform that has come from the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, private landowners 
challenged the state’s land reform statute, which was designed to reduce the 
presence of oligopoly in the state’s land tenure patterns by using compensated 
eminent domain to broaden the class of land owners. 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984). It 
was also the model undertaken in Zimbabwe’s second iteration of post-independence 
land reform, in which the 1992 Land Acquisition Act gave the government power to 
acquire land by paying fair compensation set according to nonmarket guidelines. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6. 
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expropriating private property without paying compensation, 
though this leads to all of the problems discussed in detail in 
Part II. 
CONCLUSION: LEVERAGING LEGAL INSIGHTS TO ENCOURAGE 
LAND REFORM 
This Article set forth to argue for the value of a certain kind 
of redistributive land reform program as a model of international 
development.  It first grounded land reform squarely in its 
pragmatic and expressive goals, arguing that land reform can 
make a substantive difference in the lives of real people and 
developing nations, and therefore is a worthwhile endeavor for 
governments to undertake.  Next, it argued that market-
compatible land reform is the most pragmatic approach for 
eradicating poverty because it generates the fewest negative 
externalities that accrue to the worst-off members of society.  
Finally, it explained the wide range of programs that qualify as 
redistributive, market-compatible land reform, highlighting the 
fact that market-compatibility is an umbrella designation that 
encompasses a whole variety of programs. 
Only one problem remains:  Land reform programs still do 
not make available enough land to serve the crucial goal of 
eradicating poverty.201  Although this Article advocates for 
market-compatible land reform, the reality is that resource 
limitations have denied such programs the quantities of land 
needed to offer the kind of social change that poor, rural people 
need.202  There is “a political and social vacuum in the leadership 
of the land reform agenda” that results from civil society 
organizations advocating neoliberal approaches based on willing 
buyers and willing sellers, while land occupation movements 
 
201 Simon Granovsky-Larsen, Between the Bullet and the Bank: Agrarian 
Conflict and Access to Land in Neoliberal Guatemala, 40 J. PEASANT STUD. 325, 328 
(2013) (documenting problems with market-led agrarian reform, defined as 
programs that “encourage a shift away from state-led land distribution and towards 
market transactions intended to assist landless workers and small farmers in 
purchasing land” through “willing seller, willing buyer” approaches (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
202 Moyo, supra note 14, at 198 (arguing that rule of law conversations about 
human rights have led to critiques of methods of acquisition and expropriation, 
without offering alternatives or mobilizing resources for more extensive land 
reform). 
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continue to be shunned.203  Though this Article does not advocate 
for land occupation, such movements reveal the desperation with 
which landless peasants face their poverty. 
The solution to this problem has multiple parts.  First, 
market-compatible land reform programs that leverage the 
state’s eminent domain power present one major potential source 
of land for the rural poor; providing this land through  
market-compatible eminent domain mechanisms does not 
threaten the destabilization that rightly concerns policymakers.  
Second, in order to properly conceptualize land reform at the 
intersection of property law and international development, these 
ideas require testing in the field and application to particular 
land reform programs.  One future project in this series will 
refine this work by analyzing the successes and failures of 
particular land reform programs according to the framework 
articulated here. 
Third, legal scholarship can propose many alternative ways 
to put more resources—land and money—into land reform 
programs.  The best insights of legal scholars can improve 
dramatically the way that land reform programs operate, which 
only can assist in the realization of the goals here articulated.  
How to put rural lands into productive use to address the kinds 
of poverty here discussed remains a pressing problem.  Legal 
scholars can help identify methods by which nations can support 
the kinds of programs explained in this Article.  Capping the 
percentage of assets an individual can hold in real property is 
one possible approach.204  Or, governments can force large-scale 
landowners to choose between being taxed at full market value 
for their property or selling to the government at below market 
rates.205  The government can attempt to shift the paradigm of 
land use by creating incentives to bring fallow, underutilized 




204 GEORGE COOPER & GAVAN DAWS, LAND AND POWER IN HAWAII 6 (1985). 
205 Id. at 7. 
206 JONAS, supra note 71, at 181 (indicating that Guatemala’s post–Civil War 
peace accords provided for a tax on unused land). 
207 Moyo, supra note 14, at 189 (“Discriminatory land use policies and practices, 
and land tenure laws have tended to encourage underutilization of land or inefficient 
land use among large-scale farmers . . . .”). 
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These are an initial set of starting points that highlight how 
legal scholarship is a source of solutions and interventions.  This 
project thus is an invitation to others, particularly American 
legal scholars, for whom poverty and human suffering is a 
preoccupation to bring their methods and theories to bear on 
global poverty and inequality.  The insights of many doctrinal 
areas can be leveraged to build upon and improve the framework 
laid here. 
 
